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Introduction: IPRe, the Global Context and the Question of Ttaditional Societies
Indigenous people woddwide face a variety of serious threats to their continued cultural
distinctiveness and sustainability. Physical privations, dispossessions of land and the appropdation oF
cultural and ecologrcai hentage continue to deFrne national policies towards indigenous or traditional
societies in many parts of the wodd (e.g. ViemarrL Chin4 Tibeq Malapia, Sri lanka). In recent
decades, indigenous groups have began calling attention to and resisting a convergence of stateJevel,
commercial and intemational legal frameworks which have faciliated a wide scale "ptncy" of
indigenous cultural and biodiversity resources. Where these policies were recognized and
purposefi:lly pelpetrated during the age of colonialisrrq allegations that these same policies continue
through the more codihed and "fair" system of modem states, intemational bodies and intellectual
property rights is wordry cause for investigation. A small but growing number of analyses have
focused on this contentious normadve context, questioning the role of commercial, sate and
intemational govemmental actors in securing the rig[s of world indigenous peoples to'cultural
survival' @ateng 2001; Posey & Dutfield, 1996; Shiva 1999). Althou$r the literature on the
question of biopiracy and the associated questions it poses towards the nonnative operations of
global trade and commercial acton is still in need of geater scholady attention, investigations into
the relationship between indigenous orltural needs and the theory and practice ofwestem cultural
Iaw (Angfo European Intellectual Property fughts, or AEIPRs) are especially lacking.
Introductory Ovcrview
Part I, Methodology, introduces the research question and deails the empirical basis for the
investigation: an ana.lpis of a sedes of related case studies. The working hypothesis of the
methodology section is that 1) ifa srgnificant number of indigenous cultures throughout the world
(seven examined here) have similar concems wi$ gfobal IPR regimes, then 2) ar,guably global IP
regimes deserve reform in a genera.lized fashion that would alleviate nnnon nnpldnts advanced bv
indigenous culn-res. Attenuon is given in the methodology and in dle study to dre question ofissues
outside of this rigid frarnework, including a) enforcement of some existing but immobilized
legrslation (e.g. &te Declamtin on tlte Kglts of Penons Befughg tt National or Etltzicfuligio*: aad Uryxistic
Mixoritie: (1992),b) some advzntages of the existing IPR regime, and c) contradictions and
cimrmstances specific to some indigenous goups but not others.
Pan II, DeFrring Indigenous and Minority, briefly intoduces and discusses varying
deFrritions of fuhat'indigenous peoples are. The goal of this section is to problematize dre defrnition
'ndrgenous,' and discuss the politics of labeling representing and defrning peoples, especially when
'labelling power is distributed unevendy over ethnic and socio-economic divides. This section a.lso
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introduces some historical issues (e.g. colonialism) which are panicularly relevant for many traditional
societies.
Part III, Commonalities in Traditional Indigenous Cultures and Customary Law, posits
several unique charactenstics of mdigenous cultures spintua.l, rehgious, social and lega.l-customary
sFterns. Without over-generalizing across regional distinctions, this section will attempt to higNight
the way some charactenstics of ndigenous cultures are likely to be reflected in their customary legal
systems, and mormver, how &rese characteristics differ radically from the philosophical and material
bases ofwestem economic development, property and the notion of cuinrral commodities.
Pan IV, The Thmry and Practice ofAnglo European Intellectual Property Riglrs, provides
an assessment of intellecrual property righ* widin the societal context for which they were originally
intended. One czn consider the ana.lysis in this section as a'best case scenario'with vhich to
compare the relative functioning of A.EIPRs for indigenous peoples. If AEIPRS have unique
functions with respect to intrinsic aspects of the history and evolution of Anglo European societies,
vrhat are these unique functions and aspecs and how are they reflected in AEIPR regrmes?
Part V, The Commercial, Poliucal (State) and Intemational C-ontext of Global AEIPRs, ales
the "practice" component of Pa-rt II a step further. Law is often thought of as a "regulator" of
behaviour. Thus it is imporant to take this into account when examining w*re*rer it regulates the
behaviour of individuals, corporate actors and sates in a way that is meaningfiri and satisfying with
respect to the needs of indigenous peoples. However, it is zal the only regulator. Therefore, it is
important to examine the most important iflstitutions in addiuon to 'law' that affect the regulation of
indigenous cultural resources. The most viul of these institutions are corporate actors, political actors
such as states, and intemational global govemance structure such as the United Nations, the Wodd
Intellectual Property Association (MPO) and dre Wodd Trade Organization (especially its Trade
Related Aspecs of Intellectual Property and Services or TRIPS agreement).
Part M, C-onflics Betc/een AEIPRS and Traditional Societies, presents seven different
example which illustrate the manner in which indrgenous cultura.l policy needs were negotiated bv
actors acting in accordance with AEIPRs. This section will constitute the evidentiary portion of dris
study and the interpreation of the seven examples wrll be used to help draw conclusions and form
recommendations for the last section. This section moreover, is designed to higfrligfrt how the
differences benveen the west and many indigenous cultures is reflected by the formen institutions,
such as exclusiyist property, market commerce and hdMduzl authonhip, to name a few.
Pan WI, Summary of Polcy Discrepancies between Indigenes and AEIPRs, will draw from
the analpis of dre successes and failures involved in the interaction betq/een intellectual property
oghs and rndigenous cultures examined in order to formulate a coherent set of policy
recommendadons on how AEIPRs could (and should) be reformed.
I
I
I
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I Part I: Methodology
I a. A note on defrnition and language
IL
Before proceeding however, it is worthwhile to note that this discussion iself implies a
I r"lation to indrgenous cultures that requires mention. This discussion will no doubt reflect manyL
epistemological and Lnguistic categories particular to the west, which translate poody or not at all for
I aborigrnal peoples. As an example ofwhy this is an impormnt consideration for the analysis here,l- consider dris snldies focus on issues of indigenous ntm. As previous scholars have pointed oug
i .eparating issues ofland, ecological resources and spiritual concems from that which is considered ofr- cultural value is m anificial exercise from the perspective ofmany indigenous groups. k might be
I preferable to engage issues of land and ecologrcal resource preservation and sustainability insofar as
L those elements become engaged in the same reladon to AEIPRs as do more coflvenflonally u/estem
. cultural artifacts as folklore traditions, textile pattems, dance choreographies and the like.
r- Unforhrnately, that preference exceeds the arulytical scope proposed here, al*rough other studies
might benefit fmm a combination of indigenous cu.ltura.l and ecological concems.
I
I
b. Methodological Velidity end Rcsearch Question
Il- Given the diverse and overwhelming number of indigenous groups, this studv aims at a
I compromise between a case study ofa particular culture and a general study of alrnost all indigenous
Il- cultures. The advantages ofa case study (depth and ngour ofanalysis) are compromised by the lack
, of validity involved in inferring that the characteristics of that one group are found among all or
L almost all indigenous groups. In other terns, case studies tend to produce results tlat are un-
generalizable, and in this case, might therefore provide weal evidence of an overall failure ofwestem
I
L AEIPRs to satisfactorily meet the needs of indigenous culnrres.
Another issue involves the power disparity widin indigenous peoples thernselves, some are
I -ore public and have more resources than others, which will no doubt be reflected in this study. The
Pueblo, Maori, and various Australian Indigenous groups (Ganalbmgu) are much more broadly
I known than more anon)'rnous indigenous clans and groups. Thus, the study here v/ill attempt to findl-
as many illustrative examples of cultural producers from areas that may not receive as much
I intemational attention @ritish Columbi4 Indonesi4 etc).
II In terms ofthe second variable in dris analysis, that of Anglo European intellectual
r copyriglrs, one miglrt question whether it is valid to conceive ofsuch a complex and varied set of
L doctrines as a singularity. Are there not regional disparities and differences in regrlation and
I
I
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i .nforcement ftom the Durch influenced copyngfrt laws of Indonesia to the more progressive
copyright doctrines of Ausralia? Cerainly this is true to a degree.
i ruthougfr attention will be given to particu.larly evident regional distinctions in copyrigirt and
other related IP laws, ihere are also pressures and logics that impel a considerable degree of
i uniformity in the broad stmcture of modem IP regimes. Intemationally ratified agreements such as!' the Paris, Beme and more recently, TRIPS agreement sugest fiat limits exist as to how libera.lly
r nadons can interpret and alter d-reir IP laws. Presendy, over 148 nations are signatories in the WTO
IL TRIPS agreement, and the five-year deadline for developing nations to ratify their laws accordingly
, has long since expired, in 2000 @,fatfiews, 2002). In addition, such intemational accords ovedap in
L principle, with the TRIPS agreement in principb affnntngprevious agreemens such as the Barzs
Conwtioz for tic Pmtnior of Utenry attd Ad*lic lVorks $aia4 2001, p. 90).
I
L Me*rodologically speaking then, ifmodem intellectual property regimes can be conceived as
a broadly similar set of doctrines throughout the wodd, they can be considered for the puposes of
I dris study to be an independent vanable. The dependent variables in this study, therefore, are the!-
hdigenous groups q'hich are subiect to this "relatively consanC'stmulus (ifone can call it that).
i tf, as this study will show, commonalities exist across many different indigenous cultures inL
terms of their relationship to AEIPRs, then a set of cornrnon issues and grievances can form
I generalizations of some validity conceming the relationship between all (or most) AEIPRs andL indigenous peoples. Obviously, the more dependent variables one documents, the more
I generalizeable validrty the study will have. At least six hdigenous cuitures (dependent vanables) willL be examrned qualitatively in dris study- It is a fortunate circrrmsunce that many of dre cultr:res
, €xamined in this study are geographicaily diverse. If it can be shown that peoples as diverse
|- geographically as $e KwakwakVakw tribe in British C-olumbia C-anad4 the Pueblo Indians of the
Neru Mexico USA' the Batk producers of Smgapore and the Aborigines of Austraiia (and many
I
L more) have all been frustrated by similar failures in the way that AEIPRs regulate their culnrral
property, then the claim that AEIPR policy is in need of change has substantially more validitv.
I fuforeover, many striking similarities in the culturzl worldviews ofgeographically divene indigenousL
peoples suggest that the prospects for normative policy change could begh by accommodating some
I ofthese similarities. For example, the inextricable link between land, "art" and dre sacred (spirinrall- concems) is common to rrwry different indigenous cultures, and makes for many conflicts between
1 AEIPRs, which emphxizes exdusionary righs over conrrnr.rnal omenhip and economic over
IL spiritual concems.
r A last note to mendon within methodology is thag for reasons of necessity many faciors
Ii- asrde from indigenous culture(s) and AEIPRs are examined. These include corporate acton, politica.l
actors such as states ,nd intemational govemmental bodies u'hich perforrn (or fail to) roles erceeding
I
I
I
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the passing and enforcement oflegislation. This study will no doubt produce many critiques of these
institutions, which would drastically affect the fi.rnction of the aforementioned legislatron. It is no
doubt unfair to criticize intellectual property rights as a disthct legal doctnne and hold that doctrine
entirely responsible for the plight of indrgenous peoples cultural sustainability. A change in the
policies of intemationa.l colporate acton and stztes might rnale legislative changes less or even
entirely umecessary. A study of intellectuai property rights is nevertheless a worthwhile investigation.
Reform of laws and how they are enforced and their capacity to improve conditions on the ground
for indigenous peoples is a working assumption of this investigation and one reinforced and
supported by other scholars in the field @lgnyan,2002).
Pan II: Defining Indigenous and Minority, and Exploring Commonalities
e. Who ere indigcnous pcoples?
Before critiquing the ways in which intellectual property issues affect indigenous groups, it is
important to defme our subiect in greater detail. Just who are indigenous peoples? A dictionary
definition of indigenous usually contains the criteria of odginating or occuring naturally' within an
area or environmen! or being 'intrinsic.'
Indigenous peoples therefore, literally refen to peoples onginating from within a distrnct
geographic regron. Unfomrnately, this definition seerns to raise more questions dran it answers. One
of the central problems emergrng ftom this defrutron has to do with the fact that, if we consider
geography and history broadln we can truthfully say that all human beings are indigenous to the
earth in is tc,t,l;lty: thav an u not-i igrow peEle or eaih.l Howevet, given that humanity is usually
dissected according to linguistic and ethno-cultural divisions, the need for the terrn hdigenous to
apply to peoples who share especially strong cultural and historical connections to particular
geogra.phic areas rernains. The above term 'especially,' is not a quantiative tenq and hhts at the
vagueness and problematrc distinctions that inevitably creep into definitions of indgenous and non-
indigenous peoples.
Nonetheless, If I may propose my own (ess?) problematic distinction it might be the
following. If we were to defme indigenous peoples by arbitrarily considering peoples as those uzho
inhabited a more or less specific geographic regron ur the year 1400 A.D, as being genuinely
indigenous to that region, our defrrition would likely be very acceptable to virtually everyone. Itcould
be argued that this is merely a meticulously worded clarification of the term "since time immemorial"
which is usually used to indicate the long-terrn geographic residencies associated vith indigenous
peoples $.obbins, 1999). This defmition would categorize the people of Hawar'i as being
"indigenous" to that land, despite *re fact drat at a certain point in time, the Hawai'ian islands didn't
i
I
I
i
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I
I
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exist, and furdrermore were unocorpid by any descendents of Polynesian island tribes who would
later occupy the island and develop a disthctively Hawai'ian ethnic and cultural identit,v. North
Americzn maiority populations of European descent could not claim that the term "indigenous" as
applying to non-Europeans existrng in North and South America prior is misplaced, since those
peoples were "irnmigranr" from Asia thousands of years ago. The migration ofany ethno-cultura.l
homo sapient variant from their incubation in Africa, any corresponding environmenral speciation,
the rniring and interbreedrng of different ethno-culnrral groups due to conquest as well as category-
de$rng implications of nomadic migrations and trans-oceanic tmlpses prior to 1400 A.D. would not
be reason to discard dre historical relativity of this definition of indigenous satus.
For some, this definition would nonetheless be i.rnacceptable. Some critics of abongrna.l
rights claims such as Tom Flanagan (2000) argue that "special ueatrnent" and recogrition of
aborigrnal groups as histoncally penecuted informs a set of mrsguided policies and thinking. Man.v
have claimed that Flanagan's indisputable claim that North American aboriginals are immigrans is
made ideologically, or duplicitously. While this may be true, it does nothmg to diminish the
comparatively long time that aboriginal penons have resided in North Amedca as compared to
European "irnrnigranb,": n6r does it address the historically located and continuing social and
economic disparities between individua.ls of Europran and abongrnal descent. This brings us to
contemplate how power and ideology affects this debate. It is well and good that there are non-
aboriginal discussants in dris debate, but where are the aboriginal discussans and why do they not
receive the same promhent place in the debate as do panicipants from the controvenial Calgary
school (of which Flanagan is a member)? 3 This problem is indicated by Michael Brown's recopJrition
of the conspicuous absence of aboriginal participants in other policy spheres: "rt [is] discomfinng to
wimess Aboriginal aninrdes tovzards land, religion, and law under discussion in...forrnal setting[s]
and in the absence ofary Aboriginal people themselves" @rou'n,2003, p. 50). I would argue that it's
fair to transfer Browrr's reservations to aty dialogue conducted almost exclusively by non-aboriginals
on 'a>ehal''' or aLx>ngrnars and their rssues. .As observen and par,.cipanm rn d,i dilc,,lsrrn ofidentities to which many of us c
circumscribed on u. o, ou, oJ 
belong it is incum[gn1qr us
panicrpants-r**.,;.;;;:'::::.J:;nm":;il:ffi:*loo"*,
l,n enormous motivatir
specia.t differences a-- -o _.:.T:: 
defimng particular peoples as indigenous is to note their
"'*"""".*;;*;;ff;.-,'f:;ffiTr".leurb-an,Blobarized-.d"-,ryd,,",;o
llll*:,".;.";;;.;-,...;::::*n**1h:.#'ff ff *.',economic and political disparides u"*"". -.,-^*1"'! rrrl.,.c?u wrongs ard present social,between mainstream populatiorx 
rare unhelpfirl, misguided and
I
I
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L even cormter to the best interests of these peoples (See Flanapn, Tom, 2000; Conklin, Kerneth,
2004).
The lnernationel end Historicel Context of Ind!€nous Peopl€s: Colonization from Without
or Vithin?
Many contemporary nation-states contain large ethnic majoritres that a.lthough iridgenous to
the region, are often not considered to be 'indigenous peoples,' as in geographically isolated,
linguistically and cultuoily dislnct, non-mainstream societies. Frequendy, this definitron of
indigenous peoples has been avoided throug! the drawhg ofnational boundary lines over
indigenous territories. Consider the example of the Kurdish peoples n Iraq, Tu*ey and Iran who
have suffered enorrnous repression as a result of colonial national-boundaries that failed to ake their
sovereignty into account. Indigenous peoples are often described as under threat due to their status
as distinct communities under assimilationist pressures from a la:rger mainstream society. These
threats may take the forrn of economic pressure to conform to dernands that they export
commodities, or depart traditional lands in order to allow resource extraction companies (mining
forestry) to conduct their affarn unimpeded.
Many indigenous peoples such as those in Canada, the USA, Australia and New Zealand are
often described as colonial indigenous peoples, as they were historica.lly subject against their will to
the sovereignty and sovereignty of nations which superimposed their authority over such people as
subjects and as custodians of their traditonal lands. Although in most cases, traditional forms of
colonialism have ended during the mid 20d century, u'ith various forrns of repatriation and
compensation measures having taken place io acknowledge past inequities and assimilationalist
policies. Nevertheless, the'stamp'of colonidism is often very much apparent vi& such peoples,
who often suffer sigmficant dispanles in health, crime, income and other indicators ofsocio-
economic welfare.
Other indigenous peoples may technically reside withn the current boundaries ofnation
states, but be free from precisely the same colonial onslaught that befell North American and
Australian indigenous peoples. In Afric4 unlike in North America" with the exception of South
Africa, large European populatrons do not live alongside historically persecuted indigenous groups.
Although *re debate over colonialism is as alive as are the drsparities n health, vrelfare and income
betweeo the historically persecuted znd those who persecuted ther! current controversies centre
along neo-colonialist or have mtegated with the broader critiques of political economy. In South
America and Asi4 many indigenous ethnic groups have not fared particulady well in relation to the
nation state. Such groups might have less expedence with overt Anglo-Europearr colorualism, than
with the comparatively recent developmental dernands made by the rapidly erpznding economies of
72 of 82
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many South American and Asian states. Such developmenul demands have often urken place
alongside state policies directed towards the exterrninatron, geographic displacement or forced
integration of indigenous peoples into the general population (Bengwayar4 2002).
The discussion thus far has introduced some historical facton which produce a generalized
imperfect stratification between those introduced first, indigenous proples within a Anglo-European
post-colonial contexg and those indigenous peoples under threat ftom the govemment assisted
developmental policies. One miglt ask of this description, are there any indigenous peoples not
under immediate threat? A short answer might be, not really. Aldrough the circumstances of some
indigenous peoples are dramatically better than othen, most rernain under threat if ftom no more
insidious a trend than the desire ofyounger descendents of traditional societies to spum older ways
of life . Canada's Inuit peoples have achieved a rernarkable degree of political and geogra.phic
autonomy, as compared to other postrolonial nations. In the Philippines, a series ofprogressive
measures and laws have beeo eflacted in favour of indigenous rigbs and special protections, belying
the established trend ofmost rapidly developrng Asian states @engwayan, 2002).
Wtrat is the value in noting some general differences between indigenous peoples who have
been histoncally persecuted and subiugated wit]tn post{olonial states and those that are more
recendy under threat from local govemmens? In essence, it higl iglrs the care we must take rn
assessing defmitions of "indigenous" peoples. Some controversial scholars have argued out that in
many cases, once 'un-contaminated' indigenous peoples (in Hawai'i and British C-olumbia for
example) have since become 'hybridized' with the mainstrearn, aking part n many mainstream
crrltural, artistic and employment activities. Such peoples, drese scholars mainuin, are no longer na!!
indrgenous. Notwidrstandmg such criucs, there are srgnificant differences between indigenous
peoples (say Brazilian rainforest peoples) who have only recendy been exposed to rhe culnrrally
incompatible pressures of westemized modemity.
c. Anglo-European Powcr Rcletions and Reprcscntetioas of the 'Ortcr.
In a landmark culnral-studies text, The Inaginary Itdian: tbe Inage of the Indian in Caradiar
Cfuurc, Frands llanel exposes the hidden assumptions and logic behind those who would invent
identities and cnteria for indigenous groples to fi-rlFrll rn order to be deemed sufhciendy "authentic."
ln short, we can gamer from her text and the objections of many aboriginal scholan tlrat it is not a
task for society at large, and especially non-aborigrnal scholars, to establish the criteria by which
people can legitimately describe thernselves as being part of indigenous heritage. Whether European
bones are buried in the land (making European's "indigenous Hawai'ians" so the argument goes) or
European genes have mixed vdth those of aborigines is irelevant (ConkLn,2004). Paradoxically, it is
a violation of both the individual rigtrts ofthose who would reconnect holisticaily with their heritage
13 of 82
LI -d of the boundaries of that heritage itself, for ouside arbitrators to decide who can belong.L
Instead, it must be sufficient for an individuai to make the decision to reconnect with their traditional
i c.ulture, beliefs and forms of self-goverflment, and be accepted by that community, for ousideL
powers to consider them as such.
I To retum tlen, to the objective described at dre begiruring of this section, we shall attempt
It- to document some key characteristics of many rndigenous peoples and their woddviews in order to
I garn a better understanding ofthese peoples and how these characteristics stand in contrast to dre
IL systems implied and inherent in Anglo-European rntellectual property nghts.
There are some dear re-xons why being identified as part ofan indigenous people, that is to
L say, as beng pan ofa specifrc group idenlty or collectivity, might be desirable. Such a designation
can allow and make possible intemational or national petitions for a redress ofgievances as a
l
t_ collective, as opposed to a series of individua.ls with common complains. In intemational law the
status of the righs of collectivities is an ernerging categpry challenging the previous status quo
i i.herited from westem liberalisrn, that of only entertaining the grievances of individuals.L
Meanwhile the very notion of ideotity is being challenged in the intetdisciplinary quartes of what may
be loosely summarized as cultural snrdies. Reprcsentation of the Other - ofien as dre darker side, dre
binary opposite ofoneself- is revealed as being a mere tool for self-identification and consolidationr- of power relations, rather than a source of objective information. Identity - be it racial, ethnic, culnrral
or other - is exposed as being a social consmrct... arising througir contingeot alliances and
] oppositioos...rather than an absolute, innate phenomenon. (ftom book review of Makkonen, (2000)L by Brolrnao-o. Catherinel.
Having introduced the divergent, but often usefi:lly combined terrns ofindigenous and minority, why
I "ot rnquire fur*rer mto the politics of "labeling." People ofall kinds are and should be suspicious of
extemally created deFrnitions that declare unilaterally "what it is" that the people are, "who can
I belong" and "who can't."
|--
b, The Minority Connection
Another problematic issue involved in the term indigenous, has to do with its general
I association with minority status. Minority surtus as well as indigenous status has a general and
IL frequently supported parallel with diminished political, economic and social status relative to majoritv
, ethno-cultural groups in many nations. At the level of intemational law, concem over the righs of
IL national minorities is often sought with the intention of also benefitrng the many indigenous groups
that are etlrric and linguistic minorities in m:ny nations. Neverdreless, the two often don't
L correspond. Thus, it is imE)rtant to recogrize that zlthough there frequendy is ovedap between
these two categories, however loosely drey mi$rt be defrned, their usefirlness has limis. For example,
I ttte ndigenous Han Chinese of Chin4 constitute the overwhelming etino-cultural majoritv of thatL
country, a fact not pe&aps evident ifone assunes that mdigene corresponds to minority sanrs. In
1
L
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British Columbia however, peoples such as the Kwakwak'wakw peoples ale both indigenous to the
regon prior to 1400 and a current minority edrnecultural goup. Although there are certair y m2nY
national contexts in which mainstream populations are technically indigenous (Br:zil, Chin4 Vemam
etc), our use of the terrn indigenous will be in reference to groups &at are both indrgenous to a
national geography, and also of minority status [n bo& linguistic and dernogra.phic represenation).
Pan III: Commonalities in Traditional Indigenous Cultures and Customary Law
The goal of *ris section is to "identi$ the minimum common ground on w*rich to base constructive
understanding [motrvate] discussion, and [mpel] concerted action in divese locations around the
globe" (ndigenous Traditions and Ecology. Ed. Grinl, John, p. xxiii). The dark side of *re exercise
of seeking commonalities, or indiscrimately generalizing about many different ethnic and cultural
communities is vell surrnised by Anja Portin:
We are in danger of using colonizing discoune if we talk about indigenous peoples as entities vithout
taking the difftrences between culturcs, ad betweeo individuals q.ithin
these cultures in coosideration (IntemationalJoumal oo Minority and Group Riglrs 8:3974OL 2n07.
Anja Portin, Univenity ofTurtu, Finland).
With this iniuflction to not perpetuate a colonizing discourse typified by dre suppression of regonal
distinctions and particularities, the obiective of identi$ing some frequendy occuring characteristics
of indigenous peoples will focus as much as possible on specific examples and on avoiding
univenalizing satemens.
b. Indigenous *Lifcways"? Investigeting the concept of Interbeing of Cosmology and
Ecology
The difficulties of apprehending much less understanding indigenous culture are underscored by the
terrns we inherit from the En$ish lattg.."S. The terms we use are discrete, analytical, descnptive and
usually segregate woddly and human phenomena into categodes. These tendencies serve to obstmct
rather than assist an organic understanding ofmany indigenous cultures. Thus, the terms "lifeways"
and "interbehg ' are developed to help non-aboriginal readers to tlirik broadly and grasp cultures
which don't distflguish between religion, cultue, spiritudity and "art."
In other terrns, many indigenous cultures have a holistic nroddview which doesn't easily
translate into other linguistic or cultr.rral contexts. However, perhaps the French terrn I'histtirc des
nmubtis, whichlotssely translates into the history of cosmologies, or woddviews may be helpfi:I. The
grounded assertion of I'histoin du nntalitis is to understand "the way ordlnary people make sense of
the wo d...how they organized reality in their minds and expressed it in their behaviour...Instead of
deriving logical propositions, they think with thhgs, or with anything else that their culure makes
available to theng such as stodes and ceremonies" (Damton, 1985, p. 3). In contnst to Anglo-
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European cultures which tend to view th€mselves as distinct from and apart from "nature," rnany
indigenous cultures arc said to view drernselves as part ofa cosmologcal continuum which includes
some recuring categorizations that include the people, the land and its creatures, and the spiritual
other-wodd. Often, dependhg on the rurique aspecs of the culture in question, these wodds
intermingle (Cole, 1982). Pmple can become inhabited by spirinral beings for a time, reverting in-
between wodds with or without ceremonial aid, birds and natural creatures can represent or carry the
will of the supematural (Achebe, 1959; Grim (Ed),2001; Cole, 1982). For many aborigrnal and ribal
societies, dreaming is ofien conceived ofas an entry-point into the spiritual wodd, and often death is
viewed as part ofa natural linear process of renewal and reincamation. The land, in contrast to
secular European sensibilities, is not an alienable obiect of property rights, but rather conceived of as
a site of spiritr:al reverence and debt, to be used according to custom and sacred obligations.r
c. Cultural Production: Of Creators and Collectives
Given the holistic and collectivist nature ofmost indigenous societies, wherein ecology, spirituality
and people's activities are deeply connected, cultural producers frequendy view themselves not as
individual "authors," but rather as agens of spi{itual powers. Other re.xons for creating rnaterial or
non-material forrns of cuiture may have to do with kinship obhgatrons (grft cultures) (Coast Salish
peoples) or cerernonial purposes marking important village evens. When individuals such as
members of the mbari Igbo (ee-bo) of Nrgeria are involved in creating a cornmunal cultural work, for
exunple nbai, &tey conceive of themselves not as individual artiss, but rather a part of an engaged
collectivity workhg towards simiiar goals (C-ole, 1982, p.771.
d. Orality
Another key feature of many indigenous peoples has to do with the predominandy oral nature of
their languages, and the unique ways in which this cluracteristic hfluences their cultures. C-onsidering
that only 100 of approximately 3,000 human languages have developed a literature, this is by no
means an excepdonal phenomenon (Ong 1982). Previous studies, such as those by Walter Ong in
Oraliq and l)teraq that have usefi:lly *rmrized how the "technologr" of wnting gradually exerts its
influence on how mernbers of such societies 'tlrink' and conceive of their wodd, provide usefirl
insight into the nature of many indrgenous cultures. His well known abulauon ofsome key
tendencies in oral culnrres include:
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Exprtssion tiat is additive, rather thm subotdhative rad repetitive
As an oml statement caonot b€ retracted or reviewed rcpeatedly once it has been uttered, oral cultures &nd to
prcduce statement dlat contain more tems dtan are necessary to convey the infotmation. In addition to using
mor€ telrns to expr€ss a concept, repetition is also used to ensure the audience can miss a ftw details and still
undentand the message. ln contrast, written culhrres produce €xpression drat tends to be perspicuous (ftwer
rcdundancies).
Agregation ra&er thm malysis
Crncepts and ideas teod to be clustered together ir wap dtat aid meDory r€teotior, as opposed to what makes
sense analpically.
Cooservative or Traditiooalist
In oral societies, rhe preservation and transmission of old knowledge is of paramouat importace. As
rcpositories and data-banls of knowledge, older individuals in ao oml society are tleated vi& great rcspect aod
value. According to Ong print cultures make the role of living tnowledge relnsitoties redrmdang leading to a
degradation in their in print traditions (Ong 1981 p. 41).
Thoug.ht is dose to Hr.rmn Liftwodd; Sitrtiond Rartet th"o Abstrrcq Parricipatort rdher th'n Obiecdvdl
Distaoccd
Oral societies rend to emphasize knowledge that is direcdy relevart to their present situation. Oral
tradidoos make use of comtliaations, formulas and odler merhods to make it easier for a penon to recall
what is important for the audieoce/purpose at hmd, but not vhat chaiactedstics of a concept are
common according to a detailed analysis (e.g aooog an Are; Hatcheq, Saw; md Log members of aa
oral society wou.ld be unlikely to identi$ the 'I-og as the odd-one-out, since it is not a 'cuning
implement' NonJiterarcs wou.ld say these obiecs are the same since without the log the other obiects
would be useless.
Vtile knowledge ofobscut€ dates and facts can rcrrlaitr yithin written societies iadeEoitely due to rhe
ease with which recoded information can be retrieved, the necessity of rcmembe ring only rhat which is
irnportant (so drat everydring else can be fogotten) leads to what has been called "selecdve aonesia" in
many oral societies: The Tiv people of Nigeria used complex genealogies to assist them io recalliog
family status and kioship relationships. These dationships were recorded by the British, and compared
to the Tiv people's own accounts of the rclationships over a decade. The Tiv people later claimed that
the rccorded genealolies were iaaccurate. According to andrropologistJack Goodn the Tiv people hed
modiEed their geoealogy to accommodate population hcreases, intra-goup migratiotr ard terdtorial
conquest O'lly those parr: of the genedogy that "still mrde sense" were retdned, while the rest was
foqgotten in a prccess Goody describes as "selective amnesia'' (Goody, 1987).
Fig 1 .1 Cbatacxristix of Oral Cubunt
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In Chinua Achebe's novel Tl)ings FaA Apat, Ote vuians characters and to, nspeople of Umuofias
frequendy make use of "sayings" to a;sess a troublesome domesdc situation, pass iudgnent on a
person, or reflect on the relationship between the favour of the god's and one's p{osperity. Such
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sayings contain a tremendous arnount of inforrrration, social norms, cultural codes and ideas about
the wodd that is direcdy relevant to daily experience. For example, the saying "when the moon is
shining the cripple becomes hungry for a walk" eloqueridy refers to dre desirability of a lighted path
at night and dre dangers of the dark (Achebe, 1959). Correspondingly, as Postrnan notes oforal
societies, "rntelligence is ofun associated with aphoristic ingenuity, that is, the power to invent
compact sayings of wide applicability."
In many indigenous or oral cu.ltures (such as that of the pre-colonial Igbo people), custornary
laws and practices often reflect the tmyxtatce of mnaor JrzJr and sayings in managrng the
complexities of village social affairs. The tremendous epistemological and legal validity associated
with oral testimony, aphonsms or proverbs is n radical contrast to the complete dism.rst and
occasionally contempt associated with *re same in written Anglo-Europe'an cultures- While ulk rnay
be cheap and iudged legally unsuitable in most cases, the reverse is true in many oral societies. As
Postrnan describes of the cultural-epistemological irnportance of orality in Westem Africa:
\Vhen a dispute arises, the complainants come befote the chiefofthe tribe and state their gnevances.
Wrth no wdtten law to gurde him, the task of the chief is to search through his vast repertoire of
proverbs and sayings to find one drat suits tie situation aod is equally satisSing to both complaioaas.
That accomplished, all parties are ageed that lustice has been dooe, lhat the truth has been served
(Postrnan, 1985, p. 18).
As Posmnn notes of Anglo-European legal cultures on the other hand,
...therc is a much stronger belief in the au&enticity of writing and in particular, printing '[lis second
beliefhas litde tolerance for po€try, proverbs, sayings, parables or any other expressions of oral
wisdom...in [this] culture, lawyen do not bave to b€ wise; they need to be well briefed (?ostman,
1985, p. 19-2n)
Without examining in detail *re pzrticulzr spirinral, cultural and legal aspecs of many different
indigenous cultures, a task that would be too vast to accomplish here, the ftequendy occurring
characteristics of holistic woddviews involving an intirnate interconnection benveen people, land,
gods, an tendency to be ecologically sustainable and many of the cultural-societal characteristics
observed by Walter Ong and others, can nonetheless provide a use6. oversiew. This overview serves
to illuminate how some key aspects of indigenous cultures and their schemes and undentandings of
cultural production contrast significandy from the respective assumptions ofAnglo,European
cultures.
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Part III: The Theory and Practice of Intellectud Prop€rty Rights in Anglo-European
I*gal Systems
a. A brief history of westem petent lew
Intellecnral property riglrts in the west have a lengthy history, bo& in terms of their thmretical
concqrtualization and the lived conditions of their practice (egal, commercial, religous) within
particular time periods. Some leppl scholars use an especially extended timeline in tracing the
historical development of AEiPRs (arguably, to an extent drat stretches the boundaries of 'westem'
civilization), especially those conceming regul2tions approxinate to conventional trademark and
patent laws . C-erainly, if one takes a broad vievr of dre general rdea behind patens, many civilizations
and dominant wodd cultural areas have used somedring approximate to modem AEIPRs for
thousands of years. As an example, some scholars argue that the marks placed by Egyptran potters
on clay pos in 3200 BC are evidence of eady tademark protection (Grandstrand, 1999,p.28).
Othen pont out that in 100 BC, the Roman Empire made extensive use of trademarks to certify and
regulate everyday producs such as textiles, lamps, glasswork, cheese and medicines (Grandstr:and, p.
28). Widrin dre middle ages, the city of Venice issued a formal patent code in 1474 that permined
inventors a 20-year monopoly on the use and reproduction of their creadons. The 1474 Venetian
patent code is surprisingly modem in *rat it was esablished by a central authority, specrfied limits on
exclusive monopoly privileges and lasdy, oudined a Frne for infringemens (300 Venetian ducats)
(Grandstrand, p. 29). England followed Venice'example in 1623 with the passage ofa similar patent
law, The Statute of Monopolies, granting exclusive patent rights to new inventors for a limited term
of 14 years (Grandstrand, p. 29)
These acts closely resemble the intentions of modem patent laws. Modem patent laws still
attempt to reward cornmercia.l and individual innovators for their creativity and yet, not prol/ide
outright monopolies that migfrt give possessors of patents undue commercial power. Like their
predecessor laws, modem patent law also atternpts to prevent industrial or indrvidual foul plav
(appropriation ofother frms inventions or rigfrs to certain inventions). That said, the importznce of
patens within the commercial realm and the extent of phenomena regulated has gready expanded,
and that subject will be discussed in greater detail following an introduction to the o*rer "halF'of&e
intellectual property nghts equation. This is not to imply that intellectual property rights only include
copyrigfrts and patents, there are trade secrets, cofltracts, and trademark as well, but the two
componeflts are the most sigrificant.
I
i
I
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i f. The contestcd cvolution of copyright
, Dspite the resernblance between modem patent law afld that of mediaeval, Roman or even
L Egypdan systerns, many modem scholars of intellectual property law focus instead on the
commercial, political and intellectua.l cirorrnstances of 186 century England (and Europe at large) in
I rearch ofthe origins ofwestem intellecnral property rigfrts law. Why is this? In essence, this isL
trcause before the 186 century, there was no formalized san-rte goveming the creative output of
I ."thors. Individual inventors znd corporations could secure statutory rigfrts to protect theirt-
inventions (patens) and company-specific emblems (the basis of trademark law), but monopolv
incentives and rights for literary authon (e.g. copyrigfrt laws), were essentially nonexistent before the
Il- enlghtenment. In is place was a system of polittcai, financial and religious patronage, with othet
I kinds of authorial production taking place outside of conventional economic incentive explanations
tl- @rft culnrre, religious devotion). In post-revolutionary Engtand,liberal padiamentary sentiment and
I the growing influence of enlightenment thought set up a conflict between dre traditional system of
L relgious patronage and crown sanctioned monopolies and that ofan emergng system that privileged
the individuai autior and the public good ofliterary competition.
I
L In this case, the subiect of traditronal crown favour was a book publishing monopoly called
the Stationers Guild (Conger). To understand the fi.rll development of the ensuing conflicg we must
| "xamine some key aspects ofthe book-publishing satus quo in pre-revolutionary Enpjand from the
15e o 17d' cennuies as exemplified in is late stages by the Licensing Act of 1662. With this acg the
I g.vernment gfiurtd erclusive publishing righs to the Conger in renrm for the Guild's assistance in
ib censorhg tracts deemed seditious, heretical or "political" (3lagden, 1960). In $is manner, the crown
I and padiament was assured a staunch ally in limiting the spread of unfriendly and dangerous ideas
Il- whrle the Guild reaped the economic benefits of its satus as the sole legitimate source of new (and
r old) book, plays and poerns (Drahos, 1996, p. 22-3). Unforn:nately for dre book publishing
IL monopoly, *re Licensing Act expired in 1695, leaving the question of their conthued monopoly
I rights in question. Refusing to acknowledge any ambiguity over their rigirts, the Conger found itself
L frghtrng a growing number of smaller (often undergound) booksellers who argued that the Guild's
rergr of monopoly had expired with the Licensrng Act. Although the Conger claimed to have a
L continued monopoly because ofa long established cornrnonJaw tradition of "perpetual rights," they
nevertheless appealed to the crown to grant another st"tutory law in order to frrrn up state legrtimagv
I - their batde apinst the underground "pirates" and competitors (Iessig 2004, p. 8G7). However,L
many parliamentarians recalled the injurious history of crown-granted monopolies before and during
I the En$rsh civil war, and now wished to restrict any exclusive righs &rey might grant (kssig 2004,
Ir- p. 88). Thus, to the horror ofthe Statoners guild, the next satutory law regulatrng publishers
I
I
I
I
I
2n of 82
LI
l
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
t
L
i
I
I
I
t
I
exclusive rights "to copy," the Statute of Anne of 1710, contahed the provision that new publishing
rights be limited to fourteen years (renewable once if the author was alive) and specified that alread,v
existing rigfrs be limited to a singfe terrn of twenty-one years. The act made a compromise between
*re enlightenment view *rat ideas should enjoy unrestricted distribution throughout society so as to
ensure a rational and free-thinking public, and the market-liberal view that property rights ought to
be respected.
As an historical aside, the Statute of Anne, didnl iself end the Stationers monopoly. The
Sationers challenged the new law by arguing that the previous common law tradition allowed for
pelpetual moflopolies despite the limiation written into the new statutory law. In a famous and very
public trial, Dotadson ls. BecAett,lzuryers ot behalf of dre "infringrng" Scottish bookseller
@onaldson) and a member of the Sationers guild (Beckett) argued their cases before memben of
the House of I-ords (a Supreme C,ourt equivalent for that era) (kssig, 2004, p. 92-3). Ultimately, the
case was won in favour of Donaldson by a la4ge maiority, and in 17 42, lrc Frst public domain in
literary works was crc ted fnr tbe flst ine in westem history. This histoncal segue way might seem
extended, but it is an importaflt introduction to the many contested concepts ofwestem copyright
law.
c. Currcnt dcbees end conarovereies in 6e west
Wi*rin westem govemment policy-making circles and especially withrn legal and economic
scholarship, there is still vehement disagreement on the subject ofhow '1imited" the temporary
monopoly of the author should be in order to effectively encourage new authors to create while not
burdening future "follow-on" innovators. At one extreme there are lobbyists on behalf of major
commercial enterainment interests such as Jack Yalenti, who argue that the terms should be "forever
minus one day," while othen argue for a renrm to more traditional copyright terms. Traditionalist
legal scholars argue that creativity and innovation, whether scientific, technological or artistic, is a
collective activity, requiring a balance between d:re short-term interess of authors and the long-term
interests of creative communities (Benkler, 1999; Boyle,2001; l,essig 2001,2004). If creative
communities are starved of access to the creative contributions of their fellow mernben because dreir
contributions are witbheld from a creative community for dramaucally extended lengths of time, then
the vitality and rate of innovation is ieopardtzed. kssig Boyle, Benkler and many economists6 stress
that dramatic increases in the length ofmonopoly terrns (from 14 yean in 1710 wi& the passing of
ttre English Statute of Anne, to the life of the author plus 90 yean in 2004 with the passage of the US
Sunny-Bono Copyright Term Extension Act) is an rnpoftrnt pretruse of this argument.
Before a list of key conceptual corrpoflents ofwestem intellectual property law is examined
rn detarl, it is worth nothg that our notion of intellectual property as a unified concept has emerged
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L after its constituent components (copyngfrg patens, traderrurk laws) were already in place. Instead of
society developing a holistic branch of IP law beforehand, doctrines such as copyright and patents
emerged separately and over time became branched togedrer because ofwhat were seen to be their
sirnilarities. This means that specifrc laws such as the Statute of Arure developed not as a solution to
the question of legal rights rn "rntangrble property," but radrer to resolve a very particular problem:
how to regulate who had the right to make copies of books and other literary works (Boateng 1996;
Keden 2001). Patents initially served &e purpose of registering and protectng particulzr individuals'
industnal inventions so that the sate could ensure fair comgrnsation to the individual and punish
anv unscrupulous appropriations before the terrn expired. The obiecs of regulation during the fint
two centuries of copyright law were chiefly books and written literanrre. During the sarne penod,
patents generally regulated industrial machinery electical devices, film and sound recording devices
and light-industrial goods (bicycles, gasolne engine designs, etc).
However, in the late 196 century ard 20d' century, westem intellectual property laws and the
objects and phenomena they regulate, began to expand in scope. When the phonograph became
popr.rlar, the question ernerged of whether copyright law govemed the recording ofperforrnances in
which copynghts existed on paper music. Althougfr the way courts dea.lt with *ris issue is worthv of
deailed eraminaton, the point I wish to make is that this new invention not only raised questions of
whether topying'was allowed if no "paper copy" was used to make dre reproduction, but that the
end result of this and other technological forrnas for content is that copyright law eventually
expanded is jurisdiction to include this new forrnat. The long 20ft century tradition ofconsecutive
consumer technologies that permit the copying and redistribution of creative content that was
prctected on a previous technologlcai format (phonographs, tape recordings, Betamzx, VCR, DVD,
the Intemet and p2p technologies) has resulted in a parallel expansion of copyriglrt law jurisdiction.
Westem copyright laws now regulate a massive arnount ofpreviously unregulated information.
The law now regulates almost all newly created infomation and vimrally all new culture that
is producd whether drat culture is a scribble on a piece ofpaper, a sound recording, a motion
picture, a theatrical scdpt, a computer prograrn, daabase or website. Is riglrs don't iust apply to the
authors of work, but any party to whom an autior sells their righs. The requirement of "creativitv"
and "ongnality'' n determining whether a crezdon is novel enough for its creator to be granted a
monopoly right has gradually become watered down to the extent that astoundingly uncreative works
are now srxrunarily awarded fi.rll protection from the respective canons of (by default) copyright and
patent registration offices (especially the US patent office). See example of telqrhone databases,
Natronal Hockey kague statistics, etc. The focus has changed ftom "creativity" and "originality" to
whedrer the creator expended any effort at all iri the creation ofa given work. Similady, in the realm
ofpatens, &re question of iust what aa, be patented has evolved into the converse: what cztr't be
I
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patented? Hurnan cell lines, genetic code, entire livhg or,ganisms (often altered to a trivial ertent)
such as plants, animals and insects have all become subiect to patent claims in recent years.
Given that controversy exists in the west with regard to what kinds ofphenomena copyriglrt
and patents should regulate (e.g. disagreement exists over whether copyright should regulate
everything by default, and also, whether the patenting of life-forms is ethica.l) This debate is cerainly
a centml issue in the context ofv/estem property rights, and it also bean many srmdarities to the
concem of many legal scholars about whether copyriglrt terrns are too lengthy. Gre position algues
that drere are some drings that property rights should not be extended to mclude (ife forms etc),
while the other argues that property riglrs should not be extended in lengdr and to an extent bodr
positions can be connected to issues ofconcem for global hdigenous peoples. Extendmg copyright
and patent terrns, and expanding the range of phenomena regulated are both means of increasing
propertization. Many indigenous groups struggle agarnst the tendency ofwestemers to subsume
greater parts of the wodd and its cultr:res within the context ofproperty rights, and thus have an
interest in opposing propertization in general. This pomt leads us back to this sections' history of
intellectual property rights and borders on fund2mental philosophical and economic characteristics
ofwestem societies- Recallmg the previous historical view of bodr patens and copyrigfrt, a number
of concepts come to mind that deserve specifrc analysis in order to undersand how these conceps
firndamentally differ ftom most indigurous cultures. We've briefly examined the concept of propeqv,
surely a fundamental part of intellectual property rights. Thaq however, is just drc begiffing. The
above discussion of copyright invoked the concept of a public domain? Just what is that? The value
in conducting this exercise is to highlight how, despite the AEIPR problems in the developed wodd,
the law in question corresponds to the general industrial, philosophical, and cultural contexts of these
societies. Here are a list of higlrly contentious and historical westem assumptions, concq>nral
frameworks and instin:tions (capitalist markes, legslatures) that anchor and make possible the
finctioning ofwestem concepts of intellectual property within westem societies. Every one of these
conceps, including the most bedrock institutions: dre assumptions ofan individual's rational self
interest and the social good of private property are in dispute, however foundational the conceps
rernain. Wi$ this in mind, the followrng intellectual property institutioris are presentd as pointedly
historical and ongoing contests for tegitimacy, rather than as neutral facs from within a westem
consensus.
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LL d. Concepts and iostitutions in wcstcrn inellectual property riChb
t i. Propcrty rnd incentives: "economic rights"
Capitalist market economics is premised on the notion of individual property rigbts. Both property
l
L rights and capitalism have their beginning in the same time period and nationality that produced
copyright law: 18s century Engfand. Property rigls and capitalism did not supersede the previous
I
t system of corffnon land ownenhip and feudalism without a bitter suugle beueen rwo opposrng
forces. Since the zrgurnents in favour of property aft broadly similar whether that property is
i intellectual or noE detading the original strugle and justifications for property as a social good isL
instructive h mdentrrding the iustifications behind property in general, but will also come h handy
' when dre rmporant differences between materiai and intellectual property are dissected.
L
Property as a distinct concept was proposed by 2 series ofintellecnrzls in dre 186 cennrry
Bntish state, a large group of powerfr and entrepreneurial landowners and an influentrai group of
Il- intellectuals rqrresented the first agents of capitalism and property ownenhip. Intellectuals such as
John lncke and Adam Smith proposed that land held in common was economically wastefi:l and
L that a system of private ownership would encourage greater investrnent into dre upkeep and potential
economic productivity of fte land @yle,2003, p. 33). The British State was in an expansionary,
t imperialistic strugle for colonial power, and was in the midst of prctracted wars with France, Spain
and the American colonies. The demands which ernpire and war placed on the agricultural
I producuvity of En$and's geographically small area were inmense. The Rnglish state was thus highlyL
susceptible to the economic restructudng however harsh, so long as it promised the prospect of
I g"ater economic productivity in aid ofthe war effort. t-asdy, the group of landowners saw in thet- ideas of Locke and Smith the prospct of expanding the ownenhip of their lands by subsuming lands -
previously held in common while securing the goodwill of the state (and a handsome profit) by
r- rncreasing land productivity (especially in wool, mutton, grains and other goods).
, So who was dre opposing the "privatization" of the common public lands? The opposiuon
IL were all the common people of England who had lived and worked on common lands for centuries,
eaming tleir living off the land direcdy by producing enough agriculture and livestock to feed
IL themselves in addition to providing surpluses for the state and landownen (nobility, usuail,v).
Then as now, property is a contentious concept. The enclosure of the common lands was
I
L promoted as a social good, "saving lives" through the greater efficiency garned through pnvate
ownership. In his article'"The Second Enclosure Movement and the Constn:ction of the Public
i O"marn," David Boyle examines dris first enclosure of the En$ish common lands as holdingt-
valuable lessons not only for the "double edged" sword ofproperty rights, but additionally for the
IL
L
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L "enclosure ofthe intangible commons ofdre mind," or intellecnral property rigls (Boyle,2003: 31-
2). What does Boyle mean here? How is property more efficient than that vhich is held in common?
I fne radonale is as follows: land held in connnon suffers from economic phenomena calledL
"freeloadmg." Individuals, acting according to the rnaximization of their own self interest, will
I atternpt to extract i$ much (grain, livestock etc) out ofthe conrrnon lands urhile putting in the least
I
amount of effort and time to procure those goods. Ifpossible, they wrll "free-load" olf the effort of
I othen by exracting more good than they have themselves put in to the cornmon lands. Others will
Ir- have disincentives to manage and mainain the cornrnon lands when others can appropriate the -
I product of dreir hard work. Thus, the land suffers ftom mismaflagef,nent and under investrneng with
IL each peasant domg only that wiuch is necessary to eke out their own living and produce only the
sulplus necessary for their lord's tithe and the state's tares. The association between land held in
IL common and the under investrnent and underutilizztion ofthe land's resources has been called "the
tragedy of the commons."
I A.cordingly, dre intellectuats and property ownen argued that propefi reversed this
sinration ofunder invesfinent and low utility. When an individual owned laad, they suddenly had a
I p"rsonal self interest in investing in that land's productive potential. They also had a greatly reducedL
risk of misappropriation of investrnent- The state could prevent misappropdation and free-loadmg by
I protecthg the owners property righs - jarling or imprisoning those who would ste2l or
Ir- misappropriate that which was not owned by thern. Assured of recouping the benefits, or profit ftom
I their orighal investrnent of time and capital into the productive capacity of their lands, the property
Il- ownen had not only an incentive to invest in their lands, but to invest in the production of those
commodities that which would bring them the greatest profit. Since, as intellectuals like Adam Smith
I
L theorized, a free market ofperfectly equatized supply and demand in commodities would "naturally
assrgn high pnces to those commodities in the greatest demarid, the property ownen would in tum
I
l_ equalize the distribution of commodities by recognizing profit oppornrnities and producing
accordrngly. This system promised to rectif| the ancient system of feuda.l production wherein the
I plznting of particular crops znd the raising of livestock was a more arbitrary and ad hoc process,L
leading to underproduction of in-demand goods and overproduction of sulpluses (with the
I consequences being periods of starvation and wastefii gluts, with survation behg particular
prevalent in the 16't' century English countryside).
r Is the logic is irrefutable as oudined here? No. Without getting ovedy technical, Boyle poins
Il- out that "recent ernpirical work has indicated that it had few, if any, effecs in increasing agncultural
, production . The tragedies predicted in articles such as Hardin's Tragcdl of n Annons did not occur.
I
L In facg the commons frequently may have been well-run, though the restra-rnts on its depletion and
the incentives for inyestrnent in it may have been "softer" d-un the hard-edged norrns of private
Ij_
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property" @ole, 2003, p. 36). Nonetheless, the above rationale for property (and market capialism)
is invoked to justrfy expansions in the jurisdiction and term length of mtellectual property nghts
despite sigpificant differences between riglrs to agrarian property and those of intangible property.
ii. Merkets in intengible property: noo rival non exclusionary
Unlike material forrns ofproperty, property of intangible form can be consumed without 'deplethg'
the original resource. It is therefore non-rival: my use of a mathernatical formula or book does not
lesson anyone's knowledge of that same knowledge or book. It also follows that one of the maior
causes of tragedy in the commons, the depletron and non-renewal ofresources held in common, is
avoided with intzngible goods. Additionally, and similar in characteristic to being non-rival,
intellecnra.l property is non-exclusionary: merely owning it doesn't prevent others from also owning
it. Material property has the convenient charactedstic of being both rival and selfexclusionary. One
person's ownership and use of a field to grow com makes it impossible, or at least very difficult, for
another to raise a herd of sheep on that same field. Wdr intellectual property dts isn't the case, and
at first this doesn't seem to present a problem; doesn't everyone benefit equally? Consider the
problems it poses for those who might wish to sell their intellectual property to others. Why would a
buyer purchase that which might be easily appropriated at zero cost? The ability to exclude access to
a good to all those who don't purchase the rigfrt ofaccess (with physical goods, this occurs at the
same time as physical transfer, making transferability and exclusivity easy to preserve) is necessary in
order for a market to exist in drose goods. Wdrout the lrnited monopoly of intellectual property
protection and the markets they make possible, so the argument goes, the creators and innovators of
intellecual property have no incentive to create h the first place.
iii. Feir use, limited terms and the public domain: societies righs
Another important concept and raging debate widrin intellectual property law concems dre overall
purpose of, and limis to dre sanctity of the temporary monopolies granted n intangble goods. The
doctrine of "fair use," generally concems copyright law and creative works, and specihes that some
uses of olhers intellectual property is permitted insofar as those uses are "transformative," use only a
portion of the work involved, and don't harm the ownen economic interests. Trznsformative uses
include cerain kinds of parody, satire and criticism necessary to enable the well-linctioning of
another legal doctrine: free speech. Within the specification of economic damage, fair use is designed
to allow "free speectr," without perrmtting unfair appropriations drat might permit another penon to
appropriate the economic beneFrts of ou'nenhip of the work in question. The injunction to not cause
economic harrn by tampering with the ownen possible market rernains key, although economic harm
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caused by criticisms that steer future customers away, is and considered non-appropriative and thus
legitimate.
Fair use is contentious in that there ownership and protectionism advocates who argue drat
fair use was a compromise necessary in ari age of imperfect enforcement of property ripirts, a relic
leftover from a time when it would have been impossible to discover and prosecute instances where
indivrduals copied a greater portion of say, a book, than they would legitimately be permitted to.
Correspondingly, drey argue that in the age of digital intellectual property rigfrts and perfect
enforcement mechanisms, fair use should be tossed aside and property rigtrts should be enforced
down to the microscopic level: charging for even very small uses ofanother's property with few if
any exceptions. Panl Goldstern and his controversial papr, CoBrigltl HigluE: Fnn Gttnktg to the
Ceb:tial Jrkchx,helped popularize a view which nrns counter to what many argue is the real purpose
of fair use: to assure drat that society benefits. Defenders of farr use point argue that the entire
historical and present pulpose behrnd intellectuai prop€rty v/as not to enrich private power through
the protection of individual righs that were previously held in common, but rather to 'suffer the
rgnominy' of temporary monopolies in order that society miglt benefit from the greater productivity
enabled. Accordmgly, they view fair use as not only a prerequisite for free speech, but a valuable
measure to ensure drat society receives a ftr, but not appropriative benefit from nevr works before
the temporary monopoly expires.
The public domain has been a subiect of much recent scholady attention. Some of this
scholady aftention (Iessig Boyle) has focused on how a vibrant public domain filled with vrorks that
pass in and out of copyright and patent protection relatively qurckln more viably acs as a catalyst for
invention and creativrty The Free Culture movement emphasizes that protection and control
functions to clamp down in the innovative capacity of a well-frrnctioning public domain. So what is
the public domarn? In short, it is the label applied to works that have either never been formallv
protectd or have expired ftom the[ copyright or patent terln. Although the Free Culture movernent
could surely find allies in many indigenous communities when it comes to resisting the patentability,
or patent tenrs of certain life forrns and seed varieties, their call for a vibrant public domain is ofun
an unwelcome one from an indigenous point of view. The Anglo-European assumption that
everything traditional or old is undeserved of protection because ils
iv. Idee vs. expression
Another important principle behind htellectual property righs has to do widr its protection of ideas
as expressed in some forrr\ rather dran the ideas *remselves. Allowing ideas dremselves to become
property would undoubtedly become rnpracticable and unenforceable, and would cleady render free
speech impossible. Thus, freely expressed ideas, however valuable are assumed to be in the public
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domain, free for anyone to appropriate, modi$ (transformatively) and potentially express as their
own property. This doctrine has a contentious side, in drat public pcrforrnances and predomnantly
oral culture become vulnerable to appropriation, since it is often not practiced or recorded as a
concrete expression.
v. Individuality and 'moral righs"
Widrin copyright in parucular, certain "moral nghts" have been granted within the intemational
Beme convendon of 1886 to authoa of plays, directon of fdms and other creators of cultural forms
thought to deserve specra.l respect. Such authors have the moral flght to have their works attributed
to them personally and no one else, and to be protected from false allegations about the author and
the work created. Moral righs are also specified as nalienable: the authors unique 'moral' right
remains despite whether the work is sold or otherwise transfered from the authors possession.
Moral righs are a rarely used componant of the Beme Convention and its later intemational
ratiFrcations, but nevertheless constitute an integral component of Angto European cultural and
intellectual property protection schemes. The concept of moral nghts are contovenial among manv
critics, who dispute the idea of an ndividual beng wholly responsible for his creations, arguing
instead that "no man is an island," creating independendy of peers and previous creators. Another
aspect of this debate and undedying the entire concept of creative intellectual property is
individuality.
If one acceps the view that most creativity and innovation, whedrer technological, scientific,
literary or otherwise, is a social process, as opposed to a process entirely divisible mto rndividual acts
ofgenius, then not only are conceps of moral righs problematic, but so are broader notions of
exclusive individua.l righs in property which can only be described as dre result ofcollaboration - an
indMdual combining his or her ideas with the ideas and knowledge of others.
vi. Innovation, technology end compctition
As mentioned above indirecdy, innovation has been argued to be the most viul purpose behind
Yet, this logrc has an interesting and problemauc historical dimension that Boyle successfully
elucidates:
...There seems to be an assumption that the str€ngth ofiotetlectual property dghts must vary ioversely with the
cost of copyrng. To deal with the monk-copfst, we need no intellectual property tiglrt because physical control
of the mmuscript is enough. To deal vidr the Gutetrberg press, we need tle Statute of Arure. To deal with the
Intemet, we need the Digitzl Milennium Copyright Act, the No Electronic Theft Acg the Soony Bono Tem
Extension Acg and pedraps even the C-ollections of Infounation Antipiracy Act. As copying costs approach
zero asympotically, hteUectual property rights must approach perf€ct control @oyle,2cil3,p. 42).
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Criticizing the one-sided logic that technologies that perrnit a greater ease in copying always and
unilaterally irnpact dre interests of ntellectual property right holden for the worse, Boyle notes that
technologies such as the Intemet expand the size ofmarkes, the ease with which consumers can find
producs $earch engines) and reduce dre distribution costs involved in transfering products to
legitirnate consumers (Boyte, 2003: 42-3). Raishg the issue tlrat the benefis and harms might easily
outwer$r one another, or even tend to benefit rights holders, Boyle adds (ike I-essig rn Free
Culture), drat before demanding further protections throug! legislation, rigltts holders must
"dernonstrzte the harrn" (not incidentally a difficult dring to do given the complexity and number of
factors involved) (Bofe, 2003, p. 43; I:ssig 2004, p. 67-70).
Part III: The Com'nercial Political and Intemational Context of Global AEIPRs
The reader will note drat Pan IV of dris paper describes a C-ommercial, Political and Intemational
Cnntext to Intellectu2l Property Righs. This hx been done wrdr two propositions in mind. Firsdv, it
is dris papers assunption that the relationship between traditional societies and intellectual property
righs cannot be understood without rmderstanding the insfinrtions that leverage the policies which
taditional peoples are generally sublect to. These institutions, broad.ly speakhg are, commercial
acton (often global), sntes (egislatures for example), and supranational regulatory bodies such as
WIPO and the WTO. The validity of introducing these odrer institutions when discusshg the initial
relationship is to foregroturd that both undentanding and any possible solutions znd altematives
must take these institutions and the manner in which drey affect traditional societies into account.
Similady, in drscussing the relationship benveen 'free culture' and 'society,' I-essig makes use
of a diagram of forces that each have an affect on the 'dot' - a person or unit of property that has
their behaviour or uses of property constrained by drese regulators. l,essig argues that these forces
affect the dot "all at once," iniecdng a sense of interre.latedness and dynamism into what can become
an abstract discussion of supposedly static variables.
O0=a
Fig I 2 Adapted Diagran of 'Fom:" Afectirg Izdigmous Cultaral PotiE fnn L b:sig)
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Thediagramand*reinferencesitallowslrtveryorganicallywith*rethesislhavedeveloped
in Pan IV. Essennally, the aboriginal society in question can take the place of the dot at the centte of
the diagram. law corresponds to 'intellectual property lawr; the rnafket corresponds to commercial
actors; while architecnrre can be likened to dre govemmental and regulatory insltutrons at both state
and intemational levels. Norms may be assumed to be social expecations of what indignous
cultufes are, what uses should be made of their culture and so forth. Within many traditional
communities, inter-generational methods for constructive crafts, art and folkloric media are often
handed down through families and regulated by the community as a whole. For the Zr.uri craltsmen
of the Pueblo first nations people, certain designs are rmdentood to belong to cerain families and no
other. Pinel and Evans (1994) describe these commmity specific norms as imponant conventions
infonning dre production of Pueblo cultural forms from within that community @inel and Evans,
1994,p. al. There are ofcourse other norms and conventions that exist withrn the more broadly
conceived mainstream society (commercial norms, incentives erc) and oftefl these two sets of norms
do not correspond with indigenous norms or "cultural copyrights," as Pinel and F,vans use the term.
a. Researchcrs and scicntisls
In thei Lnok Bgond Intzlbaaal PmpaE4Darrell Posey and Graham Dutfreld's first chapter is entided
"who visits findigenous] communities and what are they seeking" (Posey and Dutfield, 1996, p. 5).
The question and the chapter are an apt way to frame a discussion of the intemational context of
global intellectr-ral property and the situation of indigenous peoples within it. Indigenous pmples
invariably play the role of 'host " willing or not, to visitors from the ouside wodd, and rt ts with this
fact in mind drat Part III proceeds; listing the most likely, and most potentally damagtng interiectors
nto locai indigenous communities fint and moving to address *re global stnrctures which frame and
theoretically control their actions after.
Among dre visitors to indigenous communities, both in the present day and histoncally, are
missionaries and religious welfare organizations- Some of these organizations and individuals provide
valuable health and educational services to indigenous cornrnunities, s'hile others seek primarily to
rnpose religious doctrhe without regard to is capacity to cause long-tern social disruption @osey
and Dutfreld, 1996,p. TS.
Researchers arid scientists from widin the varied 6elds of andropology, biology, archmlogy
and many others, visit locai communities for a variety ofreasons. Some visit for personal or
individual research purposes, intent on collecthg inforrnation and litde else, while others come at dre
behest of companies, goverunents, NGOs, academic institutions and other related institutions
(?osey and Dufreld, p. 12). The goals served by these researchers frequendy reflecs their individual
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or institutional contexts. Researchers from companies may seek out indigenous locales in order to
bioprospect for commercially valuable "raw materials" such as plants, insects and other biological
organisms. Researchers from other institutions, universities, govemment ministries or conservation
NGOs for insunce, may simply attempt to gather empirical data on rndigenous peoples themselves
or caulog inforrnadon on aspects of the local ecology (species, pollution levels, etc). The purposes
and intents of researchers vary. Researchen may arrive with good intentions for traditional
communities but be motivated by other concems, and are frequendy un2wale of how their activities
imgact local indigenous peoples @osey and Dutheld, p. 12-13)
Scientists and researchers may fail to ask permiSsion in conducting their research, or
recognize arry link between indgenous culture and ecology. As a result of these failures, they may
atternpt to appropriate, disnrrb or otherwise interfere with a complex network of social and spiritr.ral
ties important to indigenous peoples (Posey et al, p. 12).
Many researchers are motivated by organizations that share many goals and interests witlr
indigenous peoples includrng environmental and cultural preservation. Many indigenous peoples are
keen to take advantage of the oppornrnities presented by outside researchers and the institutions they
represent, whether they are non-proFrt, educational or even commercial in nature. Dependrng on the
context and the people in question, researchers and other faciliators rrray 2ct ,ts approved 'go-
betweens' for the community and the ouside world.
b. Global corporate actors
Global corporate actors are often at the heart of bio-piracy' strug$es, with mostly large
pharrnaceutical, medical and biotechnology firms focusing their attention on the plant varieties, in
many cases cultivated by indigenous peoples, as a resource 'material' freely available for their
zlteration and commercial use. Other commercial actors, such as those involved in music recodhg or
textile production rrxay wish to use hdigenous fabric pattems and musical traditions in the
production of products imbued with an "exotic" appeal. The concem with these typs of motives is
generally wofold. One, that these actors may appropriate such materials and ideas without asking
pennission, and secondly, that their activities will fail to benefit the people providing rhe ..source
material" in any way.
c. fnstitutions of global governance in intellectuel property rights
There are many intemational global govemance stnrctures that exist to regulate a variety of
phenomena including the problematic interaction between member states, hdigenous peoples and
acton from developed courtries (whether corporate, non profit institutes or individual researchers).
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These instinrtions frequendy have unclear iurisdictional claim as regulators, and even less ability to
issue binding judgnens or sarictions upon violators of intemational cultural regulation. Moreover,
there exists a strikhg disparity between drose intemational govemance stnrctures with relatively
significant clout (the WTO and the TRIPS agreement provisions) and *rat of UNESCO for example,
which can at best issue non-bhding regulations and recommendations within dre politically impotent
General Assembly of the United Nations.
i. Thc Bcrne Convcntion
Tbe Bene Coumdonfor the Pnhmox of Attistic and Literary lVork: (1886) was the first intemationallv
binding piece of legislation which mandated that member states would be required to respect other
member's copyrigfrs and intellecnral property rights. The leglslation also stated that copynghts would
be 'created automatically' by authon of new works, eridiflg the need for the registration and frling of
individual copyrights over material vrork. The Bene Coxmntiot also specifies m article 6bis dtat
specifies an authors moral right to have his or her work spared "distortions" and "derogatory
actions." Many sates such as Russia and India have interpreted anicles in the Beme convention in
innovative ways so as to fur*rer progressive cultural policy obiectives favourable to traditional
societres (R.ajan,2001). Many states and critics 1'r the developfrg wodd have developed a distaste for
moral riglrs, as it provides authors with righs beyond sale and poses problems for the riglrs of
subsequent authors and innovators to freely create transformative and derivative works.
ii. The Internetional labour Organization (ILO)
The ILO is a specialzed but low profile UN agency that deals with labour issues such as vrorkers
riglts, standards and occupational safety issues. However, despite a labour oriented agurda, this
organization has been at the forefront of many UN agencies in addressing gfobal human rights
violations, including those that concem indigenous peoples. The ILO mees yeady in June during an
Intemational Iabour C-onference in Genev4 which provides an opporhrnity for the organization to
create policy recornnrendations, general policy, work and budget programs, which can then be
adopted through majority approval. The organization has been at the forefront of many key pieces of
legislation advancing indigenous humzn righs and related cultural and intellecual property rights.
However,like the many UN committees that produce non-binding legislatron, it's capacity to actually
intervene in cases ofhuman rights and labour standard violations (such as dre state of Myarrnar) is
very limited.
iii. Thc World Inellcctual Prcperty Organizetion (\FIPIO)
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The Wodd Intellectual Property Oqgznization has for most of the duration of the United Nations
been a forum in which developing countries could issue complaints and recommendations on
intemational intellectual property policies. The organization has as its mission the "promotion and
protection of intellectual property rights," an objective potentially at odds with the unique desires of
ndigenous peoples to see particular iritellectual property rigirts curtailed (*t".i$tr of corporate
actors to obtain exclusive rights in'public domain' materials considered by indigenous peoples to be
objects of their collective stewardship)( Siochm et al, 2002, p. 85). The forum had is ou.n diffrculties,
but since collectively, developing coufltries outnumbered developed nations, developing states could
effectively leverage their combined strength to focus discussion on issues of importance to their own
members. After the creation of the WTO (the successor to the General Agreement on Trades and
Tarrifs, GATT which existed 1947 -1995) so-called Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights' or, reguiatron goveming cultural products with commercial value (including news and
entertainrnent content, newspapers, frlrrq music recordings and many other media) fell under the
iurisdiction of ttls more powerfi.rl trade and commerce-onented body. Thus, a body which was more
amenable to the aring of developing countries concems saw its exclusive authority as a regulatory
body for all concems related to ntellectual property become secondary to the WTO TRIPS
agreement. Arguably the concems of developing nations and their resisance to many problematic
free trade policies is unlkely to assure them tie same leverage in a body specifically desigred to
liberalize trade, an agenda supported by most developed nations.
iv. The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
The United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Oaganization (UNESCO) has been a global
govem:rnce structure defined by a very broad and fnpracticable humanist mandate, seeking to
. -.contribute to peace and security in tie wodd by promoting collaboration amoog nations througlr
educatior, science, culture and communication in order to furdrer universal respect for justice, for tie
rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms that are affirmed for the peoples of
the wodd, vrithout distinction. . . ( Girard, Bmce; Mahar, Amy; Siochru, Sean, 20Ol p. 72).
The UNESCOs laudable obiectives sand in marked contrast to a longsunding satus quo of gfobal
govemance, the thesis that rich and powerful nation states engage IfI a struggle for self-interest
political and economic power prior.T
Within the forum of UNESCO, there was a brief but unprecedented globa.l discussion on
the subiect of whether the existing markerbased "fre-flow" doctrine was a preferable state of affairs
(e.g. wherein media flows predominandy produced by developed countries and were consumed bv
developing wodd). Developing nations argued for a more balaaced, divene media environment and
the right ofnations to have the sovereign freedom to have their own voices heard 'r thc global
communications arena. In dre late 1970s and eady 1980s, fie dretorical batde lines were drawn
I
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between rich, industdalized westem nations choosing the free flow doctrine and developing nations
proposing a system of balanced and farr trade in media-flows (Girard et al ,2002, p. 78-9)
Unforn-rnately for the developing wodd, the developed wodd leveraged is financial advantage, with
both the US and U K leaving UNESO, crippling the oqganization with the loss of their fi.nding The
NWICO debate fell of the able in the late 1980s with the rernov:l of the NWlCO-supponive
UNESCO Director-Genera.l, Amadou Mahtar MBow was replaced by a new leader, Frederico
Mayor, who was more complicit with the free-flow doctrine (Girard et al, p. 77-8). Since the
controversial ard polarizing NWCO debate, the UNESCO has declined in importance as a fomm
which can reliably voice the concems of developing states. It has made some important proposals
and recommendations on issues of irnportance to the developing wodd, including supporting cultural
divenity, increasing media capacity in undeveloped regions and states and tacHing the need for
'democratic discourse'and a.ltemative voices rn the globa.l media arena (Girard et al, p. 80-1).
Unfortunately for developing countries and the frequendy consonant concems of many indigenous
groups, the post-NWICO UNESCO has consistendy avoided any significant criticism of the
structural problems associated with the free-flow doctrine and market-regulated global media
smlctures including increased private media concentation and declinhg organizational competition
as well as dre dedining satus of most public service media (Gimrd et al, p. 81).
Althoug! UNESCOT capacity to create policy that direcdy affects indigenous people is
limited, dre institution has a signifrcant role in skerching out the 'norrnative' oudines ofwhat a
responsible policy frameuzork would enail. Its draft declarations and other non-binding
recommendations frequendy address the issue of indrgenous peoples cultural rights and in so doing
provides an important source of policy direction and lobbying for decision-makers in more effective
o4pnizations.
v. The Vorld Trade Organization (WfO) and the Trade Releted Aspccts of
Intellcctual Property Rights CIRIPS) agreement
The world trade organizations history and purpose expressly relate to dre goal of liberalizing global
trade and rernoving bariers to the free-operation of intemational market-based commerce. The
organization's normative role is m dispute with proponeflts a€uing ftat intemational trade would be
worse off without the "faimess" made possible by the WTO trade nrles, while critics accuse the
organization ofbeing indirecdy supplicant to the dernands of multinational corporate actors as
opposed to those of citrzens withm the nations represented.
Widdn the intemational trade des of the Wodd Trade Organzation exist a set of
agreements peraining specifically to "trzde related" aspects of intellecual property nghts. Just what
arc'rrade related' intellectual property rights? Tnde related intellectual property ridlts ,re those
I
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L cuttural productions, technical inventions and trademarks that have saleable, commercial value in a
market in 'intangible' commodities. Virnrally all mtellecnral property rights that has potential value in
a market and that is created and or distributed in a WTO signatory is subiect to dris set ofliberalizing
regulations. In a very real sense, "trade related" is a way of saying rntellectual property rigfrs have a
commercial and trade 6.rnction, and therefore will now (as of 1995 that is) be regulated by dre WTO
over and above other bodies @ those other bodies sates or WIPO). TRIPS was developed as a vital
section of WTO trade rules because of a variety of factors, not least of which included a coordinated
campargn by multrnational corporate actors with interests iri iritellectual property within and between
the govemments of dre European Union, Japan and dre United Sates (Matftews,2002, p. ,16).
According to the WTO and even its critics, this purpose of TRIPS is undeniably to reduce the
differences in inte[ectual property rights regulation between all WTO signatories, and as a result ease
the trade tensions drat resulted because of these regulation gaps. As beneficial as this objective might
be, it is also trndaniable that TRIPS entailed a movement frorn lcss pmtzciott of iuzlba*at pnptl igbt:
as had been the case in many developing countries to mnre pmtection 
^s 
was more standard practice in
more industrialized nations with significant intellectual property rights industries. Proponens of
TRIPS and secure intellectual property markes stress that the beflefits of protection flow "both
ways," to both developed and developing countries, althouglr they often de-enphasize the possible
effecs upon indigenous peoples within these nations.
Thus, it rernains to be asked, how does TRIPS affect indigenous peoples and their claims for
cu.ltural protection and sovereignty? According to many critics, it doesn't. TRIPS harmonizes what
are essennally Angfo European intellectr:al property rights regimes across dre geogra.phic board,
resulting in a situation n which pharmaceutical companies and other agents in search of "raw
material" in the public domain can find that raw material in dre land, biological and culnrral resources
used by indigenous peoples and "appropriate it" for commercizl purposes (Shiv4 Vandana1996,p.
154). Oden algue that TRIPS protects the indigerious righs to exploit *reir own culture for
commercial gain as much as it does those of multinational corporate actors. Instead of a system
where infringemens of indigenous nrln-rre miglrt go unpunished if they were riglrdrlly "ov,ned" by
peoples of that culture, TRIPS allows a systern of fair treamrent and harmonized national laws
allowing fair and consistent prosecutions of inftingerrrents wherever they rrray occur.
d. Intellectud property rights aod the stete
Proceeding from supranational bodies to individual state methods of regulating intellectual property
rights we see that'more local'does not necessarily entarl 'better representadon.' Indigenous goups
and sympathetic academics have raised questions as to the calncity of state actos to use u/hat limited
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jurisdictional power they miglt have to cooperatively secure the best interests of indigenous cultural
producers and the ir traditions.
Ofun these questions centre around the decisions of some govemmens, in Indonesia and
Ghana for example, to arnend copydght legrslation in such a way that nationally distinct cultural
forrns that stand to gain litde protection from taditional copyright laws are explicitely placed under
the frequendy permanent ownership and guardianship of the state. This method, while admrrable in
the sense that it aims to correct the failures of trzditional copyright law in protecting vulnerable
cultural forms such as folklore and traditional medicinal practices, it also suffers from a tendency to
remove legitirnate crgative license from the very peoples it aims to protect. In many cases, such
legislation can define hdigenous cultural production as "infringrng'on state copyrigfrs.
Funhermore, sate orvnership dauses carry &e risk ofunfairly centralizing the process of revenue
collections from cultural exploiation, thus removing the possibrlity of local creative communities
receiving any direct Frnancial benefrt.
As miglt be expected, the stztus of indigenous peoples in poor, authoritarian states is
dramatically worse, in almost every respect. Indigenous peoples in Tibeq Sri Lank4 Bangladesh and
Viemam in particular suffer from severe forms of state repression including systernatic
discdmination, assimilation measures, land deprivations and other gross human rigfrs violations
@gwayan,2002, p. 8). In *rese and many other economically depressed states, governments are
desperate to remain receptive to foreign direct investrnent and corrply with the avaricious resource
demands of minng agnbusiness, biotechnology and oil companies @ngwayan, p. 7). With litde
incentive to extend constitutional rights to peoples whose livelihoods is an unfornmate extemality of
such forms of development, indigenous peoples and their concems are frequendy suppressed and
denied; "many govemments in Asia insist on viewing the indigenous issue as a 'rWestem' concept that
does not apply to the region" @engwayan, p. 2). Indeed, the west, viewed as a monolith, does have a
duplicitous role to play in indigenous subj'rgztion at the behest of developing countries. While some
westemers demand that such states extend westem style constitutional protections for the individual,
additional and ftequendy competing impemtives ftom (westem style) multilateral development
agencies and bank to achieve economic development objectives have a role to play in the decisions
of states to shortchange minoflty nghts for short term economic gain @ngrayarq p. 7).
Pan IV: Conflicte between AEIPRs and Traditional Societies
To converts of the view that AEIPRs fail to address the needs of the traditional societies, this study
will produce such intuitive results as to be an almost meaningless exercise: is it such a surprise that
AEIPRs only meet the needs of the west? They were designed by and for the needs ofu/estem
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LL cultura.l producers and distributorsl To lawyers schooled in westem lega.l traditions, the question will
seem inappropriate and inapplicable: AEIPRs were never designed with indrgenous needs in mind,
I .*dering a litrnus test of their appropriateness for developing countries a poindess exercise. As TomI
Greaves sumrnarizes the possible objections of IPR lawyers, "to propose allowing indigenous
I societies to patent and copyriglrt their knowledge appean on is face to be nonsense. There is no
I
identrfrable inventor, all traditronal culture is already in the public domain, and the monopoly benefis
wouJd, at best, be only for a hnite number of years. The present purpose of patefls and copyriglts is
Il- to encourage change. not to rnarnt n dre traditional" (Greaves, 19o4, p. 9). The ob;ection is a
. reasonable one, but as Greaves adds, "these objections merely define the problem" (Greaves, 1994).
I
L In essence, it is absurd to expect westem laws, especially in a field as esoteric as AEIPRs to
. apply to non-westem cultures. However, this expectation appears to be a kind ofstatus quo in
L AEIPR policy towards the developing wodd. For some, it is unreasonable to expect other culhrres to
use Anglo European legal traditions to defend indigenous cultural traditions and values, while for
i "thers; this expecation is perhaps part ofan expectalon that traditonal cultures need to 'adapt toL
the wodd" and "eam money" just like anyone. As a facilitator for community level economic garns,
I westem AEIPRs are iust what indrgenous cultures need (see Cultural Surival NGO and Posey &
lr- Dutfield, 1996). The implicit implication of economic gtobalization in and intemational
"harmonization" effors, is precisely that the developed wodd model of legality, economics and
culnue will be emulated by the developing wodd (at fie bms dctrbpcd ail ndcu@d inp!). As will be
discussed h later sections, problems associated with the nation st'ate as representative of the hterests
L and people of that state, combined r th the particular logics of trade liberalization substantiate and
problematize the relationship between AEIPRs and the indigenous societies.t
Case examplc t Cen Australien Cop'yright bc used by Australiaa Indigencs to Protect
II egainst Infringcments?s 
Buhn end Milpurrrrnr v. R & T Textiles Pty. Ltrl
L
Another well-known Australian case concems a particulady far-reaching lawsuit conceming the
I commercial infringement and appropriation of aborigrnal artwork as well as an unprecedented
Ig argument about connection between traditional cultural production and rights to land. In the case,
the plaintifrs flohnny Bulun Buluo) case was advanced by two highly skdled lawyen, who argued
L Bdun Bulun's view that "[he] is authorized or permitted by the traditlonal [clan] ownen to deprct the
matters contained in the anisuc work, and he does so for the benefit of those traditional owners and
IL under their overall drrecuon." C-onceived ofn this way, Bulun Bulun's anisuc production is
connected to clan rigfrts and knowledge, and is intirnately connected to land-specific rinrals and
IL
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stories. Michael Brown provides that a specific part ofdte trial argument and analysis was devoted to
developing a cormection between the land and Bulun Bulun's traditional painting: "The heart of the
case, after all, was the claim by the second plaintiff, Geoqge Milpumrmr, *rat the Ganalbingu people
as a whole had rights in traditionai designs that were inextncably tied to rigirts in land" (Brown,
Michael, 20M, p. 48). The case thus forwarded three issues: one, assessing the guilt ofR & T Textiles
Ltd. in is copyright infringement of Buhur Bul'.rn's Mapte Gusc arrd lf/abrfrlies ot the Wahitole and, any
damages forthcomin& and secondly, determining whether upholding traditional aboriginal cultural
nde also implied a right to land tide. Thirdly, the issue of the collective nature of aboriginal art was
nvestrgated by asking the coun whedrer Mr. Milpumrmr, dre dan leader, possessed an equal interest
in Bulun Bulun's painting. Interestrngln and as a result of the politrcal fallout from the Mabo
decision, the consideration by the court of the issue of tide in indigenous art and land led to the
"curious fact that the defence was mounted by the Mnister for Aboriginal and Torres Straight
Islander Affain, the agency ostensibly responsible for protecting the interests of the plaintiffs"
@rown, p. 48). In other terrrs, the local govemment wznted to ensure that the political-territorial
ramihcations of the Mabo decision weren't extended further.
The first of the issues was decided out of the courts, with R & T reaching a Fnancial
compensation arrangement with the plaintiffs and fJhg for banknrptcy. Wlth this issue decided, the
question of whether ngfrs to produce indigenous 2rtwork implied a rigfrt in land were refused
consideration on *re grounds because it was held that the procedures having to do with assessing
land tide were independent ofthose associated widt copyright law. I asdy, Jusuce von Doussa held
that clan chief Milpumrm.r did not hold an equiable interest in the creation of Mag>ie Gasc ad
lYaulillir at tlte lVattrbob, citsng nxrnrous instances in which aboriginal artwork was created and
exploited individually @rovn, p. 64). However, despite what appears to be a failure of the plaintiffs
to secure their initial demands, the iudge's carefirl and thougirtfirlly reasoned a rationale bv which
indigenous commtnities could assert a greater sense of control over their cultural heriuge.
Justice von Doussa concluded his mLng by stating drat although artrsts and the local
community have an equal responsibility in upholding the integrity of Ganalbhgu culture. Specifrcalln
the commumty may hold the expectation that the mdividual arust w l prosecute any violations of the
integrity of Ganalbingu culture where such actions are required, and when that artist is unable to do
so, the community may act on his or her behalf h securing the culn:ral and anistrc integnty of the
community as a whole (Brown, p. 64). lv{ipumrm-r's claim of equal interest in *re painthg was drus
unnecessary, since Bulun Bulur had aiready pursued the "vrgorous defence" of his copyright in this
case (Brown, p. 65).
Essentially, this nrling provided the community with a real sense of agency in defcnding and
securing a previously nonexistent sense of control over the way spiritually and cultur:lly valuable
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irnages and artwork could be used ouside the bounds of the commr.rnity. The nrling a.lso expresses a
compromise between the collective and individual nature of ndigenous cultural productron and the
tradiuonally individualist perspective ofcopyright law. In avoiding a nrling that forced aboriginal
norms of cuitural production to conforrn to the requiremens of AEIPRs, Justice von Doussa struck
a compromise that met with approval of many aboriginal community organizations and advocacy
groups. This mling in addition to the Mabo decision, has eked out a sgnificant legal domain in
which abonginal groups can pursue their legitimate claims to land rights and obtain a certain degree
of confidence in how dreir spiritr.r:lly embedded cultr:ral property can be used outside the
community. Alguably, these new common law riglrts belongrng to communities indicate a
reinforcement of tribal custofirary laws and traditrons that had heretofore been threatened by the
extensive economic riglrs of culturzlly infringing fiird parties.
Case exemple 2: Protecting Cultural Memory with Patetrts?
Estetc of Tasunke Vidro (Crezy Horse) vs. G. Heileman end Homcll Brcwing comguies
and Ferolito
The following case study is one I hesiathgly added to dre evideatiary section of this study- I
considered leaving it out because the US laws at issue in the case centred on publcity laws, a
dimension of intellecnral property law mosdy associated widr regulatng the imagery of US
celebrities. Nevertheless, as I am sure C-oombe henelf surrnised, thrs is even greater reason to assess
its relevancy from an indigurous point of view-
At issue is the famikar issue of tnbal socieues attempting to safeguard important aspects of
their traditional anlture and prosecute misuses. In frrlfilling drat criterion, this exarple is undoubtedly
appropriate. In fact, it would be difficuit to imagine a more offensive use of traditional Lakota culture
than for two white entreprcrieun to appropriate the name and irnage ofa revered Sioux statesman,
and assrgr his 'mark' to their newly developed brand of malt liquor. The appropriation immediately
raises obvious and egregious stereotypes of the Indian dnrnk and the use of a sacred figure in
association with it should have been un-conternplatable on that ground alone.
kgally, the case involves more dran $e difEculty of enforcing a modinrm of respect and
civility towards mdrgenous victms ofgenocide. As with Bulun Bulun, the confrontation between
indigenous traditions and the mahstream post-colonia.l systerr! and historical oppressor, would take
place withm the latter systems tribunal. As the plaintiffs in dre trial discovered, this immediately
precluded the plaintiffs ftom ushg a law appropriate for the cirnrmstance, since no such laws exist.
Thus, hstead of clarming to the court that "dre Sioux are spiritually injured by the use of an ancestral
name to market a substance which continues to poison dre lives of many Native communities," they
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instead had to ake into accor.rnt the biases of the uibunal in question and atterrrpt to subvert an
inappropnate legal doctrine (publicity rigfrts) to the unique demands of their clarm. The defendants in
the case fougfrt a vigorous batde to ensure that their right to take the name and image ofa Sioux
patriot, "from the public domarn," and apply it to any good, regardless of how culnrlally
uflacceptable such an application might be. Before dre case even proceeded to trial, dre trvo Italian
American plantiffs, Ferolito, Yultaggro & Sons, succeeded in using the US free speech rights to
quash congressional proposals banning the illegitimate use of the Crazyhorse narrre.
Ferolito Vult"egio & Sons also disputed the sigmficance of the defendants clarq suggestrng
that it was unirnportant, immaterial and that their use of the Crazy hone figure was un-related to the
historical crazy horse (despite eadier assening in the marketing of dreir product that it pald homage
to dre same "great American hero') (C-oombe, 1998,p. 2O1)
I-ater, they attempted to circumyent the entire court process entirely, by separately creating a
fictional Crazy Horse persona that they could then claim as their erdusive property right. This tactic
failed, however as the US patent office, in a rare case of nfasirya yztert zpplicatron, mled that the
mark in question violated a Trademark Act prohibiting "immoral...or scandalous m2tter; or matter
wluch may disparage.... persons,living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring
them into contempt or disrepute" (C-oombe, 1.998, 202) . Given widespread belief that this ruling was
unstable and could be overtumed at a later time, the descendents ofTasunke Witko decided to
remove that possibility by themselves daiming a property right in Crazyhoae's name.
This decision was not made without due introspection and debate among the plamtiffs, as
there had been an established radition of silence (believed to have been initiated by Crazyhorse
himself) regarding &e famdy's relationship to the long deceased spintual and military leader
(Coombe, 1998). The placing ofa property righ! even if sonrehow owned by dre iamily as a whole
(e.g. forming a colporation) involved the prospect of "privatizingl an ancestral name of srgnificance
to a wider network of extended kin thao $ose likely to be legally recognized as legal beneficiaries of
dre estate" (Coombe, 1998). Despite the recognition of these problerrratic tendencies, the plarntiffs
and their lawyers realized that tlis case could serve as a valuable public relations campaign over the
need for recognition of aborigina.l customary rights.
In their public relations effort to impel the court and the defendzns to recognize the gra.vity
of their offense and the humility owed, the plaintiffs requested as compensation "a braid of tobacco,
a racehorse, and a fou-point Pendleton blanket, for each state and month in which the malt liquor
was sold" (C-oombe, 1998). Al*rough &e case was unlilely to transpire under abonginal customary
law, the least the defendaflts atternpted to impress on the court &re nrltural differences between the
two parties, and higl igfrt the colonial expectation that Angfo European laws be used to exact
tr:ditional custornary cornperBation.
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In his nrling which broadly overtumed a previous trial court nrling in favour of the
defendants, CluefJustice Greaves noted the cfricism and duplicrtous behaviour Ferolito and
Vultaggio displayed by fint arguing that their product was an honourable homage to "great American
hero," which they then retacted, denying that their product was ever intended to evoke the Sioux
leader at all. He also noted that the defendans marketing practices cleady revealed the dishonesty of
their clarms:
Defendants exalt and talget fte forum vhere it taps a likely vein ofcustomers, but studiously avoid
martetiog and sale in the fon.m itself because their conduct is potentially offensive and tortuous
there. It seems wholly unlikely that the due process clause can be made to countenance such
distortion arrd maaipulation and this Court holds that it does not. 3
Although this case has set a usefi.rl common law precedent against a partin arly egregious cultunl
appropriation, the difficulty of obtzining such a rulng is higlrlighted by the lack of junsprudential
tools available for even cultr.ually attuned iudges to rule in favour of aboriginal customary laws. In his
ruling Greaves dismissed the potenidly rclevant Indian A* axd Crafts Lza because the plaintiffs had
failed to demonstrate "whether an individual Indian has standing to rnitiate a lawsuit under the
statute."e In other words, collectives and bibal groups need not apply. Similady, customary law was
afforded a very small place in the nrling indicating th2t without statutory basis in publicity,
advertising and privacy laws, the case would have been dismissed.
Case cxample 3: Blcnding Constiorrional rigta wi& Customery Inellcctuel Propcrty Rights
Implicetions for the KwakwelCwakw peoplc of the Delgamuulsw v. British Columbia
decision end Scction 35(1) of rlc Constitution Act, 1982
The Al:stralia Btitt Bulzn case is recognized by rnany legal scholan as the most prominent reversa.l
of traditional &inking towards indigenous customary rights to date. Following the success of
Australian indigenous peoples in obtzining a judgnent recogizmg individual obligations to ensure
the respectfi.rl use of collectively held cultural heritage, intemational legal reform efforts began
focusing nrore closely on the prospect of achieving smdar legal recogrition ofcollective and
customary legal systems in other countries. Some legal reform advocates have questioned whether
the common law precedent achieved in the Balax Brbn czse might later be circumvented bv a
satutory override declaring the nullity of indigenous communal obligations (Robbins, 1999, p. 11).
Recognizing the apparent fragility of common law precedenq David Robbns has suggested that
similar reforms in Canada might examine constitutional channels as a means of securing iurisdiction
for indigenous customary law and the collectrve rigfrs frequendy enshrined in such systems
(Robbins, 1999, p. 17).
I
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The prernise for this line of rexoning arises from two eslxcially imporunt legal
developments relatively umque to Canada. The first of these is the grxrting of a set of constitutional
protections and rights to abongnal peoples under Section 35(1) of *re Corrni ionA41982. The
second arises from the inteqpretive application of this section by Canada's supreme court in the 1990
case Ronald Ednwd Spanu a. tln pran in which a criteria was developed to evaluate aboriginal claims
for s.35(1) protections agahst contravening legislatron. In the Spatmw case, the aborigrnal litigant
challenged the constitutjonal validity of a conviction of fishing with a net la{ger than permitted by the
band license. In other terns, was the locai band law invalid if it contravened the rntended liberal
protections oudined in s.35(1)? The supreme court thus developed a set of criteria for determining
the circumstances under which inferior legislauon (e.g. bylaws or band regulatrons) could be stmck
down @iven that constitutional law is 6e Srpnnc lav of tlu lattl. kr czses uthere the aboriginal
claimant could demonstate possession ofan aboriginal right rm-exthguished prior to constitutional
protection which had subsequendy been contravened by an unjustified state interference, *ren dre
sate would be obligated to justify that interference. Where the sate failed in its justiftcation on
reasonable gpounds (conservation etc), the legislation would be required to be altered or extinguished
(X.. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075,7990 CanLII 104 (S.C.C.); Robbins, 1999,p. 12).
Althougfr the criteria is redolent in conditionality i.e. dre clairnant must bear the burden of
establishmg the harm of any legislation at their own time and expense, the nrling (rn combination
with other rulings such as Casimel, 1993) does establish a domain in which aborigrnal customary law,
itself closely linked to un-extinguished and constitutionally upheld rndrgenous rigfrs (to fish, hunt,
trap, smoke tobacco, particigate in community games, gamblng trading and inport duty-free good$
is upheld @obbins, 1993, p. 13).
some legal reforrn advocates have questioned whether the corrnon law precedent acheived in the
Bulun Blunun case mrght later be cirmmvented by a statutory or'erride declaring $e nulliw of
indigenous communal obligatiofls Eobbins, 1999, p. 11) Recogrizing the zpparerit fr2gility of
common law precedeng David Robbins has suggested that similar reforms in Canada might examine
constitutional channels as a means of securhg iurisdiction for indigenous custornary law and the
collective rights frequendy enshrined in such systems fi.obbins, 1999, p. 11).
The premise for this line of reasoning arises from two especially important legal
developmens unique to Canada. The first of these is the granthg of a set of constitutional
protections and rights to aboriginal peoples under Section 35(1) of tte Constitution Aa,1982. The
second arises ftom the inteqpretive application of this section by Canada's supreme court in the 1990
ca.r'e Bonald Edzud Spanu t tln ptccn in which a criteria was developed to evaluate aboriginal claims
for s.35(1) protections against contravening policies or legislation.In t\e Sparmv case, the aboriginal
litigant challenged the constinrtional validity ofa conviction of fishing with a net larger than
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permitted by the band license. In other terms, the court v/ei asked vhether dre local band laqu .'x'as
invalid given the protections oudined in s.35(1). In response, the supreme court thus developed a set
of criteria by which inferior legislation could be struck down in a constin-rtional challeoge. In cases
where the aboriginal claimant could demonstrate possessiofl ofan aborigrnal right un-extinguished
prior to constitutional protection q*tch had subsequendy been abrogated, then the court was obliged
to restore drat right.
The novelty in this coastitutional intelpretation involves $e scope ofaboriginal activities
protected due to their practice within pre-colonial traditions. Ifpre-colonial aborignal customary law
involved the righs of families and ribes to have their disthct marks, ernblems and culturally specifrc
folklore protected ftom use by non-belonging panies, are descendens ofthese same tribal goups
entided to constitutional s.35(1) affrrmations of traditional customary for similar presentday
purposes? Althouglr this intelpreation remarns rmtested by a case as yet, the progressive
interpreations of s.35(1) made in Jpanuz and subsequenly m Dclganukn, rtdicate that a funue case
mi$rt empower customary legal protections with constitutional force.
Case cxamplc 4: Is Satc Ownership the Anewcr?
a. Gheneian febric pmducers (kcntc cloth)
Fig 1 3 Obaabfa Mn* Man Cloth to
(Orc nan dus not mb a natin)
Fig L4 KJ.Ettic
(fk lion mtttcr)
States may attempt to overcome the conceptual biases ofAEIPRs by amending their own national
copyriglrt laws to protect cultural knowledge ftat is assumed to be unworthy of protection. As most
forrns of indigenous knowledge (such as folklore) fail to satisfy the "non-obvious" and "individuaily
created" requircmeflts for protection privileged within AEIPRs traditjons, states such as Ghana have
added their own copyright clauses to cornpensate for these shorrcomings wi&out dispensing with the
westem lega.l structurcs necessary to obtain reciprocal trade relatioos within the WTO and other
various bilateral tnde agre€rnents @nteng 2002, p.574). When Ghana revised its copyright laws in
2000 to make them TRlPS*ompliant, it sought to protect its domestic cultural producers by
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L "natiomlizing ' is definitions of folklore such that the sate and the president became the perpetual
owner ofany folHore (Boateng p. 573). Although these measure appear to be defendable as 2 mearls
of protecting those cultural forms drat are unprotected under conventional copyright law, the
practice raises its own problems for indigenous culturai producers.
State ownership and control over folklore rigfrs and the any royalties that might accrue from
their use prevents indigenous producers ftom having control over and benefiting from their own
culture. Communications scholar Boatema Boateng describes the practice as replicating the "owner-
producer power disparities drat adse from the regulation of intellectual property lwhich further]
restricts access to a creative resource even for the Ghanaim people in whose name the state claims to
protect folHore" qBoateng p. 574). Although Boateng sees legitrmacy in the declared purposes for
the revised law on folklore, she algues that an altemate plan drat might share loyalties more direcdy
to indigenous cultural producers themselves would be preferable to the existing arrangement. This
example demonstrates how state interventions can go wrong even wi$ (possible) good intentions
and leads us to a considefation of the policies of states operating without any concem for the best
interess of domestic indigenous peoples. If a compromise benveen caving to the demands of
intemational legal harrnonization can have such adverse impacts, what of those states that see no
reason to protect their indigenous peoples?
As Bill Morrow no tes n bts papr A:pects of htzlbaml Pnpatl and Textibs, the Anglo European
fi.rndamenals inforrning Indonesian copyriglt law have resulted in an assurnption drat traditional
batik and textile designs are part of the public domain and are available for anyone's use (lvlorrow,
2000, p. 18). It is drerefore possible for a thrd party dying ageng manufacturer or fabric producer to
copy a traditional batik desrgn onto a &ess or paper material without asking anyone's perrnission or
b. Indonesien Betik Producers
FiB 1 .5 CcPbk Bahk tl Fig I .6 Modcn Batih
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L paying remittaflce to residents of fie geographic area whose anceston originad $e design in
question.
Even if the design is borrowed from a set of artiss who continue to work in the traditional
vein of their ancestors, it is by no means assured that their creations will be deemed "orignal" in a
tribrmal inforrned by Anglo European copyrigftt sensibilities. Artisans and batik designers who
deliberately continue to work with traditional desrgn elements and methods may be iudged to be
engaged in acs of "copying" public domain materials and thus not involved in dre creation
sufficiently novel to warr:nt copynght protection. If sufficiendy novel works were created by these
indigenous artisans, in the absence of altem^E ttli gt tetirleqlslation, any economic rewards drat miglrt
accumulate from the sale of these batik designs would accnre to the individual artist and not to the
community ofpractitioners wfio collectively continue the tradition of batik fabric designing and
applicatron. This familiar example of the inability of existing intemational copyright and intellectual
property rigbt agreements to ake into account the collective and uibal nature ofmuch cultural
production in the wodd at large, is made worse by govemment policies which move rn radical
dhections to halt this admittedly problematic legal bias.
In is reaction to this problematic tendency of Anglo European intellectual property rights
(AEIPRs) in the absence of countervailing legislation, the Indonesian amended is copyright act with
clauses similar to those made in Ghana:
Morrow notes *rat dre copyright refened to in Article 10(1) is perpetual, drus creating the same
bizarre problems as in the Ghana. Do indigenous communities that onginated many of the batik
pattems protectd by dre satute need to ask the state for permission to continue creating and
copying these panems? What does state ownership entail? Government approvals for reproduction
or is ownership construed in more socialistic terms: do all citizens of Indonesia possess the riglrt to
use and reproduce these traditional pattems and cultural works?
I\-
Artide 10 of the Indonesian @yrig[t law govides tbet
1. The State shall hold the C.opyright to wotts of arr-haeological and hisodcal remains md oder obiects of
national and culrusl significaoce.
2 a- Publidy owned worts, such as stodes, legends, fairy tales, folkules, epics, songs, handicrafo, classical and
folk dances, choteography, c"lligraphy aad other wotts of cultural and artistic sigoificaace, shall be maiotaioed
and protected by the State:
b. Copytiglrt to anicle (2) a- is held by the Stzte and is applicabtre outside the country.
3. State Copldglrt ofwo*s described ir 6is artide are furher stipulated ia the Govemment Regulation.
(Morrow, 19)
Fig 1 .7 Excerpt of Indolesian Copright Act qutifring Stztc Onnmhp oJ lrdignous Cubural Traditions
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Morrow notes that geogra.phical iadicators of the kind used by France and Scodand to l2bel
whiskey, cognac and wine botdes accordiflg to specific geographical locations oforigin and prosecute
fakes, might be pursued in Indonesia under the TRIPS agreernent as a meims of securiflg benefits for
local batik producing communities. However, this proposition carries with it a number of problems.
Modem batik involves Sikh artistic influences from India" flower and cloud motifs from Chha and
many other cultures @Iorow, 20). Preventing extemal batik producers ftom making use of common
motifs or labeling their works batik might shut down some more blatznt appropriations, while also
threatening to end $e cultural exchange ofinfluences and sensibilities that some identify as a posiuve
contribution to modem batik. Morow notes that geographical indicators protect producers only
when they reside within geogra.phic regions of protection, preventing them from carrying their
tradrtions with them as they travel to other regions (lvfonow,20).
Despite the failings of geographica.l indicators as a method for protecting Indonesian
indigenous batik producen, it has rnany zdvantages over the unenforcezble znd stunting effects of
blanket sate owneahip. Secondly, aithough Indonesia batik culture is widely acknowledged to be
histoncally syncretic, or a culture drat can reconcile runy differeflt systems ofbeliet it will need
specialfoms of yoteaioa in order to suwive modemizing pressures and the desmictive appropriations
of indigenous cultural traditions by outsiders (Morrow,21).
Cese Study 5: Meori Art and Commerciel end Artistic Appropriations
'Yor sho*ld h h4p1 to ban a tibate toyn nmul andyarpopb"
spofupenon forfrchion deiper Thienl Magbr n
From pop singer Robbie Williams kom design on his left arrn, to GQ rnag zhe covers and Nike ads
depicting soccer star Eric Cantona with moko (attoo) ovedaid on his head, as well as fashion
designers Paco Rabarrre, Thierry Mugfer and Jean Paul Gaultier's collections, it is app:uent drat a
renaissance in the popularity of Maori culture has occured. However, drese incidences have exposed
a familiar schism in thinking about dre use of a cultural tradition by outsiders or non-Maori - a
schism that, as Peter Shand notes, does not necessarily reflect ethnic divisions. Some voices, such as
Maori MP John Tamihere have described these cultural appropdations by outsiders as a "branding
opporhmity," or an opporh.niry to highhght the distrnctiveness of Maori culture as a kind of share
that can only benefit from the upward trend of interest in global indigenous culnres (Ward,2000).
Others in the Maori community and outside it have identified a patemalistic and colonialist ethos in
the assumption drat unaudrorized akings of indigenous culture are an assumed public good as far as
that cornmunity is concemed, regardless ofwhether the cornmunity is acknowledged or compensated
I
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Fig 1 .8 Inags ReJbaing Culurra@ Pmbbnaac Usags fo Non-Maori of Indignorc Mni Ta Moko
From left to right Robbie W'rlliams with tulternttc Ta Moko on left arm by Maori artist Te Rargitu Netm4
Paco Rabarure's Spring/Sl.rrrwr,et 7998 A t n collection with models sporting skimpy koru desrgn out6ts;
French soccer star Eric Canona in a Nike advertisemert and in aJaouary 1998 GQ men's magazine editorial
photoggph.l3
During the same time that Rabanne and Gaultier asserted dreir right to borrow designs from dreir
sacred contexts of origination and situate them in dislocated and culturally inappropriate contexts of
erotic appeal and voyeuristic exoticisrrq a small swimwear manufacnrrer gathered considerable press
attention through its departr:re from this long estabhshed, statas quo for the avaricious fashion wodd.
During Moontide Swimwear's debut in Sydney Fashion week featr:ring a number of fabrics
with imprinted koru motifs, commentators and cultural critics noted that not only did the company
contact local conrnunity elden and obain pennission for this borrowing but they also ensured that
part of the garment sa.les were retumed to relevant indigenous connnunity (the Pirirakau hapu sub-
tribe of the Ngati Rangrml people) (Shand,2002, p. 71). Shand is carefirl to place this exemple in
an appropflate context.
He descdbes this context as firsdy, a discrete arr:ngtrnent
betwcen the swimwear manufacturcr and Buddy Mikaere
an elder from the Piriralau hapu sub tribe of the Ngati Riangnur
people. Secondly, the erample is a remarkable example ofa
corporation and is design team acting in a highly "un-corporate"
manner. Theoredcally, colporations are designed to pursue pm6ts
under the constraint of purely legal and economic factors, leaving
the question of their role in promoting overall social good to the
"invisible hand" of the market. Aguably, the company might have
decided that their arget markeCs social conscience might have
made their effort economically as well as ethically viable. In any
case, and despite this case studies status as a zenith in relations
between corporations and indigenous peoples, Shand's insigh$n
contextualization is indicative of more fundamental uncertahties.
Fig 1 .9 Mutidc Sa.'inveat
Pmaotioral Bmchm 99/ 0O ra
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between colporations and indigenous peoples, Shand's insightfin Pronoioml Bmch*n 99/M1a
contextualization is indicative of more fundamental uncertairities.
The first problem nvolves whether voluntary measures are the best method ofensuring
ethical or normative behaviour. C-olporate social responsibility and indeed charity is in many cases
suggestive of ills unmitigated by broader polcy frameworks, and in *ris case, an indication of the
absence of intellectual property frarneworks inpellinga cenan degree of community consultation and
approval to ensure the appropriate use of Maori cultural heritage. Secondly, the discrete arrangement
between the rwo parties raises issues of representation.
With what degree of legitimacy can Buddy Mikaere bestow upon third panies dre right to
use cultural work that origrnate from a collectivity? Does he speak for Maori anisans and
gatekeepers beyond the Piriralau hapu sub-tribe? If many Maori tibespeople were outraged about
Gaultier and Ratranne's use of koru motifs exclusively reserved for men in the design of risqu6
women's haute nutnn, didn't the use of related motifs with scanty bathing suits raise similar concems
(Shand, 76)? Buddy Mikaere and Te Rangitu Netana (the attoo artist for Robbie Williams) are
gatekeepers of Maori legitimacy for broad commr-nities, suggesting a need for greater consensus
buddrng withm communities and especially among constituents of those elden who can more
propedy become designated arbiters of third-party borowings.
Cese Study 6: Pueblo Arts and Crefts
One of the principle foci of traditiona.l societies with respect to intellectual property concems the
restriction of inauthentic and rmauthorized versions of taditronal arts and crafts from competing in
an often-crowded markeplace. In other cases, a loss of control over the sacred commonwealth of
symbols and images within a traditional community can result in unsanctioned disseminations to
society at large. Once permitted to reach a broad public, control over native imagery and its usages is
usually lost permanendy.
In the case of the Pueblo people of New Mexico, a lucrative US $800 million trade in Indian
arts and crafts is threatened by businesses and individuals that would pass off cheaper, often poor
quality imiations h lieu of authentic, expe'nsively manufactured traditional ars and ccafis (Evans &
Pinel, 1994, p. 47). In this case, indrviduals ouside the Cochiti Pueblo community had used a
chainsaw to quickly hollow out aspen wood componens for use in makhg C-ochiti drums without
adherhg to the methodical and time consuming raditional process of dying and carving the wood.
Traditional Cochiti and Taois drum makers urged the sate to amend existhg legislation to prevent
irniations from not only usulping economic benefits rightfi ly belongrng to traditional drum makers,
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et al, 47).
In the late 1980s, the US state of New Mexico examined its existing legislation and passed a
series of arnendmens to rectif a situation that threatened bo$ fte identity of authentic Indian
crafspersons, and deprived the Pueblo (and the sate) of economic b€riefit. In essence, Pueblo
activists and representative wanted the legislation to include definitions of what constitutes authentic
"Indians" and "Indian art" into state law, in order to restrict fakes and prosecute imitators. The law
placed the burden of determming the authenticity ofan object and its maker on proprietors and
vendors. Yendon were required to determine:
1. Ifdrc maker uras an Indian as defined by trihal emollrnent or certificae of Indian blood,
2. If dre obiect is had made or machine nrade and"
3. If manrials are audlentic (naturalness) or serni-pocessed. (s€. e'n Gt 4 4?
Fign I .l A Cittria for Dettrnining Aathenticiry of lxdiar Perons and Cuds a'itbin Nea' Merin I iat Artt
and Cr{tr Pmaaion I zu
Although the act was supported by a coalition of Indian arusts and distributors, and presumably by
the relevant federally recogized ribes, the ultimate bill was delayed for several years due to concems
about how the act defined "Indian" authenticity, bodr in terms ofthe penon or anisan involved and
in terms of the labeling applied to traditional crafis (Evans et al, 48).
Althougfr the law sought to rectifr a situation wherein a lack of tribal ability to police
misuses and misrepresentadons of trihal identity and manufacture, many Indian artists were not
represented by the law's scope. Some aniss wished to create art using contemporary materials and
without a strict reliance on traditional artistic guidelines. They wondered why their art should be
labeled 'Indian" due to their ethnic status as opposed to a lzbel that more accurately descriptive of
their worl such as "fine art."(Evans et al, 48). Indian artists outside of trihal communities also
objected to having dreir an pass the same "authenticity" test despite *re fact that they did not claim
tribal status. Why should ribal governrnerits be able to monitor individuals and their activities if they
neither used traditional styles nor subscribed to specific tribal satus? These artists felt that the law
should sricdy regulate r*'ho could create art using traditional styles, and what materials and quality
that style would be required to emulate, as opposed to embedding tibally defrned rights within a law
impacting individua.ls at lalge (Evans et al, 48).
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Fig 1 .l 1 JeneTP*bb Sary*ller fo ltourd Tsosic 15 Fig 1 .l 2 Natnio Storytzlbr by Hryllis Nc7ft
The law rarsed questions regarding the source of the "authenticity" in need of protection.
Was the cultural tradition, or the practice something that could be authentic or not, or was it the
person doing the creating? 17 The law also raised the issue ofwhether there could be such a thing as a
"generic" Indian person or product, as opposed to a specifically delineated famdizl or hibal identity,
ostensibly one more deserving of protection. Iivans and Pinel ask, "does the label "lndian-made"
point to an Indian as an mdividual or to group identity?" They cite the example of Navajo who sell
"Navajo storytellers" pottery figurines at a lesser price than C-ochiti Pueblo "origrnals." This case is
illumrnatng because storytellers in dre form of pottery figurines are a distincdy Puebloan cultural
concept which has been copied by some Navajo artists and sold under drat tdbes n2me. 'fhis creates
additional problems because in most cases the "tademark" sought for protection is an authentic
"lndia.n" mark, not a specihc Pueblo Indian mark. States have so far attempted to rid the market of
obvious fakes and misrepresenations without disting.rishing between different cultural traditions to
prosecute generic "Indian" representations of culturally specific traditions (Evans et al, 48). Thus,
Evans and Pinel suggest drat trihs may need to pursue a definition and labeling system that goes
beyond the binary Indian, non-indian protection scheme.
The criticisms directed so far against the New Mexico State Commission on Indian Affain,
the various tribal groups involved and the amendments proposed for the New Mexin Indian Arts and
Craftr Prutcction lat, migfrt suggest that the law isn't a novel and valuable attempt to address
indigenous cultural protection. On the contrary, the law is a valuable and novel legslatrve measure in
place of what would surely be a legal-policy vacuum in is absence. The law addresses a basic
problem facing a tribe or Indian anist when they attempt to combat inftingements or misuses of
their individual or collective traditions off-reservadon, or agarnst a third party (social scientist,
colporation or non-abongnal artrst). If a social scientist or other third paqv documents distinctivelv
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Pueblozn cultural heriage, crafts methods or spiritual imagery in the creation of dreir own work, the
by-default nature of intellectual property dght law (copynght) ensures that any later publication will
result in the firtl gamut of intellectual property rigfrt protection allotted to new creative works. After
the fact (e.g. publication), there is litde &re tnbe or individual Indian arust can do to prevent
intellectual property protections from adhering to the derivative work as opposed to the cultural "raw
material" used. Agarnst any criticisms, the artists and social scientiss usua.lly lay claim to their "right"
to pick and choose raw material wherever they might frrrd it, arid that their "individual creation" is
worthy of protection regardless of how cultr-rrally biased such a right rs; violating a tenuous and
generally unrecogrized set of tribal collective riglrs and sovereignty @,vans et al, 50; Meigfran 1986,
9-12; Coombes, 1998,27+15). Until group rights over cultural property are better safeguarded in the
US and elsewhere, Pueblo artiss and tribal groups appear iustified n their extreme reticence to
divulge any informauon or cultural knowledge that they sund to lose all control over ex post faclo.
Part YI: S .rn'nary of Policy Discrepanciee between Indigenes and AEIPRs
The existing intellecnral property framework and is relation to the needs of rndigenous and
traditional cultures has been thus far examined with seven case studies. In combinatioq these studies
provide an indication of the range and complexity ofissues facing many indigenous groups. Most of
the societies examined have sought to protect *reir cultural heritage ftom misuse and appropriation
while still allowing cerain aspects of the culnrre to be commercialized. For those indigenous peoples
r.nable or unwilling to obtain complete isolation from the outside wodd, the economic susainability
and self-sufficiency dnt can be obtahed through the respectfirl economic exploitation of traditional
knowledge and culture is a worthwhile objective, In attempting to accornrnodate tie preceding
objective, many indigenous groups confront *re problematic tendencies of Anglo-European
intellectual property laws, the preeminent determination ofwhat kinds of creativity are deserved of
protection in the hrst place, who may create things wor*ry of protection and what objectives that
protection is desigred to achieve. More often than not, the tendencies ofAngfo-European
intellecnral property laws clash vigorously with the expectations and hopes of traditional societies.
Cleady, the former wasn't desrgned for the latter.
Never*reless, the objective rrality of the wodd forces us to state that these laws and their
associated ribunals are relatively established. The membership ofmost developed and developing
cotrntries in intemationai agreements such as tte Bene xrd, Paris Contntions and, more recendy, the
II/TO-TKIPS Agvenml sugest that these laws will remah influential for many yean to come. The
challenge for govemmens, traditional societies and concemed NGOs will be crafong a parchwork of
policies that preserves those elemens of dre existhg legzl system that are arnenable to the needs of
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indigenous societies, while at the same time annulling particulady dismptive legl doctrines and biases
through the developrnent of altemate (t* S.oil legislation specifically crafted to Preserve traditional
knowledge. For the Pueblo of New Merico, this has happened, wi$ varying degrees of
implemenation and success.
The term 'parchwor!' when used in combination widr 'policy' can invoke a sense of
ineffectiveness, with mxnerous flaws arising from the fact that the policy in question wasn't
specifrcally moulded for the purpose in question. In many cases, such a supposition would be conect.
In the use of publicity laws to litigtte Estau of Tarntke lZitko (Cmry HorQ us. G. Hcibnan and HonelJ
Bnving n@anics a Faoito, we have an ineffective parchwork situatioq with the law being used as
de-facto cultural policy, when social norrns and bad public relations should have made the cultural
trespass unviable in the frnt place. Intellectual property law is a multidirnensional phenomenon, with
regulation aking place at the local, national and intemational level. It is rnpossible to draft rar 3ezani
legislation that (by definition) has (no) bearhg beyond a locality, and still less on the intemational
stage. Moreover, the dominance of accords such as the TRIPS agreement make it incumbent on
indigenous peoples to use (or subvert?) alre'ady existent doctrines to their pqposes as much as
possible. Some voices have already srated loudly and firrnly that westem intellectuai property rights
are inherendy incompatible with indigenous lxoples.
This is a strong statement afld it may be broadly true. However, organizations such as WIPO
and many national goyeflxnents often lack the luxury of dismanding culturally inappropriate laws in
their entrrety. In addition, what of the customary lega.l systems of trzditronal societies? Many of these
legal systems entail inforrnal provisions mandathg that specific families erjoy monopoly status over
generational marks, symbols and tribal procedures. Some batik fabrics and kente cloths are reserved
for specific spiritual and religious purposes (rnaniages, cerernonies), with infringements presumably
prosecutable acconding to tribal law. It is a presumptuous position to assume that "non-westem"
societies possess no equivalent to intellectual property riglrts, althouglr the notion that they
necessarily involve property, or an individual righs-holder may be suerchrng things. Secondarilv,
there comes the pragmatic issue of "throwing out the baby with the basked' in declaring that
intellecnral properry righs are inherendy inappropnate for mdigenous societres.
Should the slune agrcement *nt holds the possibility for traditional crafo and art to be
protectd in the sarne manner as French chanpagze be dismissed because it may help enable increased
patenting of indigenous medicines, seed varieties and ecologically vital life forms? This is a difficult
question to answer. My hope is that such hi$r-stakes tradeoffs wrll be ururecessary, and that at the
very leasg indigenous groups will have a greater stake in the negotiation of compromises and
tradmffs than they have previously had (e.g TKIPS Agrcnnl. Surely, the decision making process
will be assisted by all parties recognition of the difference between "protecting specifrc persons or
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collectivities cultura.l or intellectual contributions" and the much more contentious and culturally
specific docnines of Anglo European intellectual property rigltts law.
To summarize the problems involved h "making the findigenous] wodd over according to"
the specific demands of AngfoEuropean intellectuai property righs, dre following doctdnes, biases
and tendencies arise in the case studies examhed and in secondary literature as being especially
problematic (Shand, 52).
AEIPRS have ianovation as the goat rader then prcscrvetion
Avoiding the essentialist position that all taditronal cultures are static and synchronic,
with "peoples doomed to repeat a diminishing range of known devices," the tendency of indigenous
oral culn-ues to be "coriservative" or traditionalist is well documented by anthropologss Walter Ong
and and Jack Goody (falal Asad 1973; see also Freud 1913; Ifvi-Strauss 1955; puotzt in Shud,2002,
p. 66). This doesnl apply to atl indigenous cultures equally, especially those that have come into
contact with mzny other cultures. In his snrdy of intellectua.l property and Indonesian batik, Bill
Morrow notes that regions such as the "[Yogyakara [are deFrned by] culture [that] is an overlav of
Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist and indigenous tnrditions vith aspects of Chinese and Westem culture"
@lonow, 21). Among peoples that value the distinctive elements of their culnrral traditrons, AEIPRs
appear rmfair: protecting most elements of Westem culture (since that culture is theoretically
authored more recendy) while leaving traditionai orlture o;rn for all to use.
Thus the divergence in dre two philosophies rernains. AEIPRs involve the notion that
progress ought to be encouraged through economic incentives, and that traditional culture does not
require protection. Conversely, many traditional cultures exist in a homoeostatic relation to their past.
Withrn many indigenous woddviews, "progrcss" at any rrvrteria.l or cultural cost isn't seen as a
priority necessardy thouglrt to lead to a better society or wodd.
AEIPRs embed the notion of individuel ingcnuity, whilc tibal systems emphasize individual
obligations to the collective and 6e secrcd
Indigenous culnral works are often created out of a sense of spiritual obligation (e.g. Igbo
mbari) or spring from inter-generational customs. For the Kwakwak'wakw people of British
C-olumbi4 a person who might be described as a celebrity artist h westem terms is instead seen as a
"trarned practitioner and master ofthe formal artistic and creative disciplines ofour people" (l.Jeel
and Bin 20C{, puoted in Shandr 2002, p.65). Although the dislncaon might be fure, it is reasonable to
assume that the Kwakwak'wakvr and many other traditional societies don't attach quite the same
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conc?ts of rorrvrntic artistic g<rius, which still rernain powerfi:l and distincdy hdividualistic socio-
cultural convictions in Anglo-European societies (Wolff, 1993).
Additionally, the close connection between things cultr.rral or anistic (categories familiar in
the west) and things spiritual is obscured, or even nonexistent in many traditronal societies. Manv
indigenous anisans conceive of dreir vocation as both a duty and a privilege. For those who use arg
crafts and folklore to invoke powerfi.rl sacred forces or the spirits of long dead ancestors, the
presumption ofan individual "owning" and having exclusive control over those artifacts would be
unthrnkable. Given strong connections between an individual's vocation and that established by the
community as a whole, combined with a sense of indebtedness to previous generations, the
individual rarely comes to see the product of their activity as their exclusive propertv.
AEIPRs protcct meterial cxprcssion, redcr thrn non-metcrial (oral) cxprcssion
Within the European tradition, copyrigirt and patent laws reflect the "bias ofliteracy" through the
doctnne that only written or materially expressed works can be the subiect ofa ternporary monopoly
right. This docthe is pardy adsing from an abiding enlghtenment-era beliefthat monopolies are an
inherent "evil" to be tolerated for no longer a period than absolutely necess2ry (fhomas B. Macaulay,
London, I-ongmarrs, Green, and C-o. 7897; Qntd h tsoy1e,2003, p. 53). When the disparate set of
ideas that would eventually form modem intellecnul property riglrs laws were still being considered
and debated, monopolies in material works were aiready considered contentious, without adding oral
expression to the mix. Thomas Jefferson conceived of ideas, whether orally expressed or otherwise,
as instmmens of social good and benefrt drat normatively belonged beyond the individualt exclusive
control:
"If naturc has made arry one thing less susceptible than all othen of exclusive property, it is the action
of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it
to himselt lrut the moment it is divulged, it forces iself into the possession ofevery one, and the
rcceiver caoaot dispossess himself of it" (I-etter to Isaac McPhetson, Mooticello, August 13, 1813)
There are many medrods for dinrlging ideas, but none remains so uriprotected as oral speech.
Presumably, the act of speaking enails a corresponding relinquishment of any riglrs to those ideas,
while the inscnption of those same ideas in material forrn does not. Whether this "bras" in
communicative mediums is arbitrary or nog we can be sure the free transmission and propagation of
ideas is mvolved somehow and iust as sure that the end restrlt is higlriy problematic for indigenous
pmples.
Recall that the needs of indigenous peoples with respect to any intellectual property right
policy is principally, a means of exerting communal control over who uses traditional knowlerige, and
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hovr it can be used. We can infer that wonies about the comrptive power of monopolies and
economic incentives are pedraps, far down on the list ofpriorities. Instead, the cefltral problem
becornes how to exert corffnunal conuol over traditiona.l, likely exclusively oral culn-rre using
AEIPRS fiat treat drat knowledge as essentially ineligible for protection: neither being ideas in an
eligible format (expressed on paper, DVD, htemet htrnl), nor 'new enougfr' to deserve protection
even if they were expressed materially. Instead, such ideas are assumed to be in the public domain,
available for all to use. Were an hdigenous penon to obtain the tribal and religious permissions
necessary to claim an exclusive monopoly riglrt over a given piece of traditioflal knowledge or
culture, their claim likely wouldn't be recognized on grounds that the work in question farls dre test
of "origna.lity" necessary for a work to be accorded intellectual property right protection.
Some critics sugest th2t beneath materiality is a more fundamenal assumption that
protection should only be accorded to works that are permanent in their forrn. Materiality assures
this requirement wi*r d-re r.urforn:nate consequence that much tradrtronal culture is neither
peorvurent nor ffurtenal. As Peter Shand descnbes this conditron, "it ignores. . . fthe aboriginal view
thatl the "things" drat most warrrnt protecdon are often not phpically manifested. The ideas behhd
the. . .performances, narratives, principles of design, the meanings of these, the secret and/or sacred
nature of drese interwoven concems . . . can be of greater and more lasting "value" to peoples"
(Shand, 6a). Ultimateln whether one uses the tenn permanence or matenality, the end result lor
traditional custodians (e.g. ofvisual desigr principles or sacred dances) is that AEIPRs disenfranchise
*reir ability to stop r.rnauthorized uses and appropriations of the "things" most va.lued and sanctified.
AEIPRS protect new (original) culture and not oldcr (often traditional) culare from rhe
public domein (non-original)
The claim that traditional knowledge and practice is "unoriginal" seems a cr:lturzlly contingeng and
seemingly insensitive claim. Indeed, perhaps this doctrine is at the heart of condemnations that
intellectual property rights are inherendy "racist" and "colonialist" (Statemens made by COICA in
Blakeney, 1997,p.30). One the one hand, this seems an inaccurate accusation. Some mrght argue
that AF,IPRs are culturally blind, since it applies to both the concertos of Mozart and the folkloric
traditrons of Ghana to be in the public domain.18 This would be a misleadrng claim (:ee mdnote 1 lS, x
AEIPRs are in and of themselves cultr.rally specific, but not inherendy racist or colonialist. Instead,
the disparagrnent seerns more fitting for those who would apply these culturally specrfic doctrines to
other cultures without taking into accormt the specific prejudices of these laws and rigfrts.
The requirement of originality before AEIPRs can be invoked is easily one of the most
problematic for traditional culure. Even if traditional cultures could be broken dowm into *re
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discrete material componeots appropriate for copyrigb! the communal nature of most tribal cultural
traditions would render that culture ineligible because it is "widely known." Anything widely known
in the Anglo-European tradition, and thus presumably willingty disseminated beyond the bounds of
dre originating individuai artist, is deemed to be in the public domain and cannot be assigned an
individual property rigfrt. Thus, many indigenous scholars and advocates clash with champions of the
public domain (Iessrg 2004; Boyle,2003; Benkler,2003) because they see the doctnne not as an
enabler of inforrrrational democratization or commons-based innovation, but as a means of denying
hdigenous people control over their cultural heritage @oateng 2002,p.574; Kedey,2001).
However, the claim of ineLgibility on the basis ofa lack of originality is especially contentious
doctrine when one considers *nt the origina.lity quotient in most "new" creative work is actua.lly
quite low.
Widrin $e 6elds of film criticism and the related area of structuralist cultura.l studies, there
have been many persuasive accounts of how much cultural production (e.g. popular novels,
Holllwood/Bollywood or Chinese action frlms, computer games) often closely reflects an established
gmn, Eminendy copyriglable film genres such as'trorrol'are replete with forrnulaic narrative
devices, sound cues and overall visual guidelines which constrain the universe ofpossible creative
iterations down to a much more manageable set ofvariables.re Within the strucnrralist school of
drouglrt, a cultural tradition such as Golden Age Hollywood films are conceived of in linguisuc
terrns: possessing a cerah common grammar and synax fiat allows audiences to understarid the
f m's rreaning ( Rosen, 1986, p.8l Mev,,1986,p.59). As David Bordwell writes of this phenomenon,
'lve should look not only for innovatioris but for normalization, pattems of majority or orstomary
practice . . . authorial difference m Hollywood thus dramatizes the range and limis of the classical
garadign" (Bordwell, 1985, p. 32). By dissecting the content carefi.rlly, the "romantic genius" ofmany
Golden Age Hollywood directors can be recast iri less flattering tems: as the skillfi.rl manipulation of
film grammar and slnax according to well-esablished narrative genres and industrial imperatives.
Given that genre is by definition a collectively esablished traditron widr individual genre
represeritations ofu exhibiting a proponionally modest degree of originality, the assumption drat
indigenous cultural represenmtions aie unotiginal by virnre of being widely known and collectively
produced seems ignorant and hypocritical- As Michael Brovm notes, "...today most works granted
copyright or patent potection are the product of corporate laboratones, design studros, software
teams, and research-anddevelopment facilities, forms of communalism built on imprsonal contracts
and financial power rather than shared values and group solidarity'' @rov'n,2004, p. 67). If Anglo-
European crrlture reflecs a similar collective (thouglr not recognized as such) manipulation of
comrnon tropes and devices, the inherent categorization of traditional knowledge as being in the
public domah because it is "unoriginal" seerns absurd. Althougfr that claim may stem ftom thet
L
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L materialist-pennanence doctrine already examined or from the pragmatic issue ofhow to asceff2rn
authorship if that function is ignored or suppressed (e.g. the orignator is unknown, unrecognized as
i ruch, or is collective h nanrre) *re unplication that any material awarded a copy'right or patent is
therefore "original" or is highly suspect.
I In the realm ofpatents, nuny scholars have algued that the parallel principle of "non-t- obviousness" has been applied in a manner similar to that of orighaiity, with multinationai coqponte
I actors able to pateflt indigenous plant varieties and medicines througfr the introduction of "non-
Ii- obvious" modifications. The commercialization of plants and medicines forrnedy held in common
, (aka in pubtic donair) is then argued to pose the dsk of depriving the access of indigenous farrners and
IL healers to the sane "raw material" that drey cultivated in the first place. I have tughlighted raw
matedal to emphasize the view that what is deemed to be a nanrrally occurring subsance and what
IL consuutes a non-obvious innovation can be a product of ignorance. As Vandana Shiva and Radha
Holla-Bhar describe the position ofIndizn farmers, "multinational companies have no right to
! "xpropriate the fruit of centuries of experirnentation and several decades of Indian scientificL
research" and describe of the specific patents claimed by US corporations, "...the exstrng patents
I zpply only to medrods...that are simply an extension ofthe traditional processes used for millennia
in making Neem based products" (Shiva & Holla-Bhzr,7996, p. 151). These claims significandy
I undermine two bases for legitimacy claimed by the neem patentee, W.R. Grace, that thc matcrid inl- question is naturally occurrhg and that dre patent in question is "non obvious." Perhaps
I corporations should be compelled to take into account the relative obviousness ofa patent
Il- 'innovation'n the region in which they derive the associated raw rnaterial.
AEIPRs embed the notion of individuel crcetion end ertistic eu6ors, while indigenous
societics view creativity as thc product of collcctive traditions
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The above discussion and the case examples have discussed the mdrviduaiistic bias of AEIPRs and
the collectivist tendencies of most tribal creative communities many times. Indeed it would be
difficult to discuss the problems of using AEIPRS to inform a set of suitable indigenous culnrral
policies without confronting this issue. Human riglrts tnbunals provide further indicanons of *te
centrality of this issue through the difficultres encountered in using individualistically oriented human
rigfrts laws to attempt to protect fte rigbts of groups @edey,2001). Many advocates in fie area of
human righs and indigenous culture have described the two argas as ovedapping and internvined,
stating that the individual human rigfrts of membes of traditional societies are violated iftlre
collective righs of *rat culture or people are violated or denied. Moreover, this conditionai
relationship includes cultural susainability as one of its mam prerequisites: as Erica Daes,
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Chairperson for the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations describes the relationship,
"indigenous peoples cannot survive, or exercise fundamental human rights as distinct nations,
societies a.nd peoples, without the ability to conserve, revive, develop and teach the wisdom they
have inherited from their anceston" (Siniela & Ramcharan, 2005, p. 5). In contrast with this
imperative, AEIPRs enshrine the notion that protective rights over culhlft ougbt to be granted only
to individual authors, and gnore the question of group protective rights over culture. It must be the
task ofany altemative intellectual property nghs regime to create a group right, or adapt existing
policies to ensure that susainability as 'distinct nations, societres and peoples'can be assured.
Pan VII: $r'rnrnaty of Alternatives ald Recommendations to Mitigate Discrqrancies
Accordmg to the local, nation2i and intemational dimensions of the relation berween rntellectu'al
property rights and indigenous peoples sketched out in Part III, the altematives intellectual property
policies put forward here will be similady categorized. While an ideal pnlicy framework from the
point of view of indigenous peoples would involve complementary policies at all tiree levels, the
reality is somewhat different. Sovereignty becomes a key issue with tensions between community
level agreernens and nationa.l procedures and laws, and at a broader level, between state policies and
intemational binding or non-binding agreements. States can still wield a sizeable degree of latitude in
determining indigenous affairs, and there are several clauses in the WTO TRIPS agreement and
others (the Wodd Summit on Biological Diversity) that speci$ some breathing room for Sui Generis
strategies. Nonetheless, trade liberalization and intellectual property rigls harrnonization are logics
that contrzst strongly with the "culn.rra.l nationalization" strrtegies pursued by Ghana and Indonesia,
strategies drat could prompt criticisms of trade protectionism.
Local Stretegies
The local level rernains an important but frag e base for creating policy solutions. Generally
speaking community hxed strategies for dealing with "outsiden" can be shortlived and limrted in
terms of providng a lasting solution for indigenous cultural rights if they lack state suppon and the
support of broader legal framework sensidve to their needs.
In many cases, "local strategies" may in fact conform to dre long established and (often)
ecologica.lly and spiritually compatible customary procedures and laws used by traditronal societres to
regulate the behaviour ofzn arex inhabians. As Posey and Dutfield argue, although drese strategies
arc the most appropriate for indgenous peoples, they often suffer ftom a lack of recognition by
national authorities due h part to their tendency to be practiced oralln and evolve over time.
Attemps to codr$ traditronal and customary laws may assist recognition by regional and national
I
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IL authorities but rnay hamper the imporance of being mdleable to evolving social and spirinral
concems (Posey and Dudield, 1996), On the other hand, customary legal systerns are often very
complex and codification could assist national authorities and expers in gaining an undersandhg of
just how these rrrles and laws work (Nlog 7987; p*orzd z7 Posey and Dutfreld, 1996).
e. Contrects?
Nonetheless, the premise of using a local option such as a contract to speci$ the terms of a
relationship between a traditional people leoding the use of its knowledge (wiether medicinal or
cultural) and a corporation wishing to exploit that knowledge in some way, remains an often-
ovedooked and relatively simple means of crerating a bilateral policy which can be binding for both
parties and legally enforceable (Posey & DutFreld, 1996). Tribal communities often regard many parts
of their culture and the local land as behg inappropriate for outriglrt commercial exploitation. The
land may be the territory ofa spiritual being and a panicular cultural form may be judged to be
inalienable from the local shaman, family, or the community as a whole. In drese cases, a contrect or
covenant can specif| what cultural aspects can be propnrly said to be under an individual or group's
stewardship and the kinds of exploitation that can be carried out u'i*r it.
There are many different kinds of agreements a tribal or traditional community might enter
into widr an outside party. License agreemefls offer Eaditional societies the option of'leasing '
rather than selling their intellectual or cultural property outright (and thus being more likely to
relinquish control over it through they'rrl sab doarint).x Posey and Drudeld sugest the GNU
(General Public License) software licensing agreement as a usefirl template for indrgenous groups
wishing to explicidy stzte that a giveri piece of cultural property or knowledge may be used or
modified, but that no commercial exploitation can occur with any associated derivative or
modification. Clauses can be added specifying which kinds of"uses" can be made, as many tribal
groups have concems over culturally or spiritually inappropriate misuses of their heritage.
Nevertheless, a GNUlike license could effectively eliminate ,n enomlors potentid for misuse and
exploitation by explicidy forbidding commercial usages.
Nevertheless, traditional societies are often unfamiliar with dre fine points of contract law
and it is imporrant that competent legal observers and NGOs be consulted to ensure that any
bindng contracs arc flot hamstrung by vague language, ambiguities and easily exploiable loopholes
posey & DutFreld, 1996).
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The national level (including provinces and sates) remains the most critical arena in which
in.ligenous culnral policy issues will be decided. It is no accident that it is within this arena that most
case studies have identified problems md solutions.
a. Statc Ownership: Out of thc Pan and into thc Firc
As discussed by Boatema Boateng and Bill Morrow ofthe nations ofGhana and lndonesia
respectively, dre anernpts by the sate to assert perpetual ownership over folkloric znd traditional
text e craft tradinons is aithough laudable, a very problernalc policy.
To summarize objections made in the analysis of case study 4 a) and b), the amendments to
the copyright acts in these countries runs the risk ofusulping royalties that might otherwise flow to
the very culnrral producers these acts zre intended to "protect" @nten& 2002, p. 574). The acs also
complicate the legal satus of the indigenous producers tiemselves: are they infringmg on the state's
property by continuing to panicipate in dre creation of artifacs and knowledge that are "state
owned"? Lasdy, sate ownership is such a broad legal assertion that it places the burden of
prosecuting infringernens solely on the state rather dran offioading some of this burden on
individuals, local communities, NGOs and companies that might be capable of prosecuting
infringements on a more particularistic basis.
b. Using Sui Gencris Principles to Reinforce Customary Rights
The term sui generis literally means "unique" or " in a class of is ovm-" Sui Generis legal
classifications are said to exist independendy of other categorizations due to the specific creation of
an entidement or obliption.zt Within the realm of intellectual property riglrs, sui generis riglts are
unique to specific classes of items or ngfrts-holders, such as plant-breeders, mask works, ship hull
designen and database designen.z
The principle ofintellecnral property rights that are sui geneds to daabase designers,
creating special rights dnt 2re applicable especially to creators of this kind of intellectual property is
very amenable to the indigenous peoples. Sui generis rights were awarded to database designers
because of the argument that although the creators of these work were not engaged h crating
something inherendy novel, original or indeed "creative," they were nonetheless expending effon
"sweat off the brov/' in the creation of something valuable and intzngible.a Sui generis righs are
essentially legal concessions that say that these kinds of creations are special with specific
entidements and obligations attached to $e ' property" in question. In tie seven case studies
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exarnined above and sumrnarized below, a legal tribunal or leglslanue has attempted to demarcate a
special legal terrain withia which traditional creaton and cultural stewards have protections above
and beyond dlose normally assigned.
i. Common Law
In lrc B n B an anl Otlten r- R Cv T Textiles,he plzntjffs setded their initial batde against an
infringrng third party out of court without difficulty while failing to convince the court that a) the
tnbal leader had specific rigbts to drc artwork in question and b) that communal riglrs to the artwork
in question entailed a commrmal right to the land on which *re piece's creation depended (a clarm
not heard because it exceeded the jurisdiaion of the court in question) @rown,20M, p.64).
Nevertheless, the judge ruled that "an artist is entided to consider to pursue his own interests, for
example by selling the artwork, but dre anist is not perrnitted to shed the overidhg obLgation to act
to preserve the integrity of Ganalbingu culture where action for that purpose is required" @rown,
2004,p.64). fu a result of this decision and the specifics of its ruling the Ganalbingu community is
entrusted with common law authority to issue grievances against aborigrna.l artists who refuse to
safeguard Ganalbhgu culture suffrciendy, and where such artists are unable to prosecute misuses
themselves, to seek out any third parues themselves.
Effectively, this rulhg creates a special sui generis riglt for $e Ganalbingu community
regarding what can be done with aboriginai art and culnre by outsiders and what options the
community, as a collectivity, can pursue to persecute misuses. However, the ruling benefis and
suffers from its status as cornmon law precedent. On the one hand, the precedent is likely to have
sway in other communities where a sirnilar case arises. However, because it is oaj, common law,
statutory law or constitutional law may override it - two arenas with an ambivalent legrslatrve
sympathy for aboriginal concems.24
ii. Statutory
Two statutory strategies developed to reinforce dre ability of tribal communities to regulate misuses
and appropriations of their culture include the recendy amended Ncat Mcxa A* and Craft Pnxction
L-aat and 6e Maori-Madt Md*.. WJnt solutions represent remarkably innovative and progressive legal
attempts to suppress blauntly mrsrepreseotative cultural appropriations and confront the problematic
question ofu'hat consdtutes an "authentic" tribal crafisperson, and how authenticity can be
determhed accordhg to faditional guidelines for the manufacture of arts of crafts.
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a) Thc New Mexico Arts end Crafts Prottction Law
The New Mexico law and its amendments stated that it was the duty of any person selling
purponedly Indizn iterrs to ensure that the creator was of Indian status (as defined by a federally
recognized tribe), that the item was indicated to be either machine or rnar made, and if the materials
were "natural" or serni-processed (Pinel & Evans, 199t p. 4?). The lavr succeeded in removing many
of the legal iustifications large-scale commercial appropriaton could use in their defence, but also left
many questions and issues unresolved.
Many lndian artists objected to having their objects labeled "Indian" whether they wished to
have that label applied or not. These artiss :rgued drat dre act unnecessarily dealt with dre
authenticity ofthe individual, when instead it could more effectively achieve its goals through the
reguJation of craft obiects that q'ere more easily verifiable 2s representadve ofan authentic craft
tradition (as defned by the tibe in quesuon) finel & Evans, 1994,p.48). The act also left the issue
of "inra-group" appropriations unresolved, as the "Indian-made" mark applied as easrly to
"appropriating' Navaio craftspeople as it did to "authentic" Pueblo artisans- Nonetheless, the act
recognized that cultural collectivities, however problematically defined (e.g. only federally recognized
groups obtained protection, not extra-tibal individuals or groups) had a rigirt to police infringements
and misrepresentations of their cultural heritage and created an administrative and legal infrastructure
with which to penalize infringements.
b) The Maori Made Mark (Ioi lhorM)
Paralleling developments in Australia6 (6e Abriglnal I akl ofAutintici\) and (as documented above)
in New Mexico, indigenous Maori have successfully developed a set of tradernarks and labels to help
differentiate authentic consumer products from "rip-offs" (Shand,2002, p. 78). As in Australia and
New Mexico, imiations of local craft and art nzditrons ultimately mislead undisceming touriss and
redirect economic benefits away from producen of culturally appropriate and higfr quality crafts.
Also, as u'ith the Pueblo and Galabingu for example, the store of cultural motifs, designs and crafs
that indigenous people consider appropriate to market for tourist purposes usually excludes many
items reserved for special and/or sacred pulposes only. Thus, marking systems such as the Maori
Made Mark allow control to be vested in tribal authorities instead of the vagaries of consumer
demznd-
According to Peter Shand, the central focus of both the New Mexico and Maori-Made-Mark
is the authenticity of the "audror," which seems interesting given dre corrplahts against that focus by
urban Puebloans uninterested rn having their work automatically labelled as "Indian" instead of
I
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something more rep.esentative of conternporixteous art fofins (e.g. Fine Art). However, unlike the
New Mexico law, membership widrin the Toi Iho system is voluntary, meaning tnbal authontres
carnot mandate drat certain artiss' work be labeled anaori' without their perrnission, nor can they
compel artists to subscribe to the tradernark system if they do not wish to. This creates some
problems. As Shand notes, there needs to be a significant "take up" by Maori artiss to reduce the
amount of unmarked items for sale on the rnarket and increase the likelihood drat tourists will
purchase goods from Toi Iho registrms (Shand, 2002, p. 80). As evidence of dre barien facing
adoption, Shand notes dre "fitfirl progress" proponents of the Aborigrnal Label of Authenucity have
had in making a dent in popular tourist m2rkets such as Alice Springs: where "authentically rnade"
Didgeridoos can be purchased in the name of Aborighal peoples who 'hather pamted nor
sanctioned" them. Despite the similady unfornrnate dependerice by Toi Iho proponens on the
maiority of Maori artiss and art buyers to " act edrically," the marking system has some distinct
advantages over *re New Mexico Am and Crafo Protection Act.
toi iho "mo/n /y n1col toi iho*mooti co-ptoducllontoi iho,mooti mod.a
Fig. 1 .1 ) Thc Tbne Designation: of tbe Toi lbo (Maon Mad) Tradenarking Slstzn %
One of the main advanages involves a greater statification ofwho can be involved in the crcation of
cultural work protected by the mark. The Maon-Made Mark explicidy welcomes parmerships of the
kind involved in the Moontide Sq'imwear and Pirirakua Sub-Tribe. Where a third party submits to
the quality control st ndards and consulation mandated by the Toi iho C-o-Productron group, they
are vrelcome to borrovr from and use Maori heritage and the work of is anists. Such behaviour may
translate into not just a mark signifmg ethically designated ethicality, but may prove to be
economically usefi.rl if consumers are willing to discriminate aginst corrpanies atrd individuals who
borrow without similar perrnissions. In addition, the "mainly Maon" mark helps prevent
disenfranchisement among mosdy Maori artisans and craftsmen who explore parmenhips with some
non-Maori artiss. Presumably, this label is intended to prevent stdct ednicity divides from
hampering a certain degre of ethnic rnixing among Maori crratives, while still ensuring enouglr
"Maori" are present to ensure authenticity.
Al*rough $e differentiation among the mark helps make the policy more inclusive, while
not malhg it "too inclusive," problems remain. One of these has to do with the legrtimacy of the
Toi Iho board to judge dre quality of proposed work. As with the tendency of the New Mexico act
to create cultural arbitrators out of tribal leades, the Toi iho trademarkhg policy raises "the specter
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L ofan overly deterministic" and to1>down approach to determiflations of vrhat constitutes "quality'
Maori products (Shand,2002, p. 79). It may be that broader representation on the Toi Iho board may
help alleviate concems about bureaucracy and hierarchal culnrral policy making. tocalized and
community based decision makhg boards could lixon with tnbal leaders in assessing the quality,
authenticity and appropriateness of any controversial pieces. Ultimately, although these concems are
certainly worth being aware of, it seems that the more urgent concem vrould be "take up." If the only
concem facing Maod are problems of authenticity and quality deterrninations within that creative
connnunity, then the Toi Iho mark will be a success - having eliminated or shalply reduced the more
egregious concem of outsiden using their culture indiscriminately and insensinvely.
iii. Constitutional
1nfus pzper Aboriginal Custon, Coptiglt aad tln Canadiar Consti*Eoa, David Robbins interpres (at
least) two progressive, precedent-setting constitr.rtional law cases, Spatma ,. tbe puee4 and, DeQamuukw
u. Britisb Cobnbia 2/ and the xsociated nrlings associated with each to argue that aboriginal customary
nghts to specific uses ofcress, markings and motifs can be protected under section 35(1) ofthe
constitution act. Section 35(1) sates that "*re existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal
peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed." a This clause has been interpreted to
emphasize the following "the existing abongrnal. . . rights of fte aborighal peoples of Cnada are
recogmzed and affirmed" which strongly indicates that laws already existent in Canada and in use by
aboriginal peoples prior to confederation should be recognized and confirrned by the Canadian state.
Another terrn for "laws already in use" by aborigrnal peoples are, customary laws, some of which
involve specific rights to tribal markings, visua.l iconography and related motifs. Robbins cites seven
case law (cornmon law) principles which strongfy sugests that such an intelpretation is waranted, of
which t'wo are key:
(vn) a) &ction 35(1) should be given a genemus and libeol interpretation in favour of abodgaal
peoplesie and
(vn) b) Wherc there is any doubt or ambigulty wit}r regads to what falls within the scope and
de6nition of s.35(1), such doubt and ambiguity must b€ resolved in favour of aboriginal peoples.{
Assuming this intelpretation is varranted and is eventually confrlrned through futr.rre nrlings that
affrrn aboriginal customary law, the question then becomes, just what kind of customary laws are
applicable and how do they provide a desirable altemative to existing Canadian Copynght I-aw and
other satutes?
Robbms identifies the Kwakwak'wakw people of British C-olumbia as having a partrculady
developed system of intangible rigfrts arising from dre podatch system (Robbins, 1999, p. 18):
IL
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business includes the conferring ard removal ofnames, tides, rights ard obligations as well as dispute
rcsolution and sanction imposition...each positioo or name carried by a Kwakwak'wakw pelson
entails a bundle of tigbs and obtgations.. ..the social position inhercnt withh the nune Kidikhltvga,
hcludes riglrts rgalding crests, dances, songs, types of cercmonial regali4 etc @obbins, 1999, p. 19).
In many cases, these complex sets of tide-based rights can involve the exclusive, and occasionally
perpetual rigfrt to produce derivative works @obbins, 1999,p. 19).
It is easy to see how these elaborate and complex customary laws and entidement
procedures would conflict wifi dird parties' economic rigfrt to make derivative works based on any
material or source, whether aboriginal or otherwise. Although such an act would be a clear violation
of aboriginal custom2ry law, it would be virtually impossible for the Kwakurak'wakw to atternpt to
prosecute anyone outside the bounds of their tribal community. Arguably, the struggle to have a case
such as this heard by the Supreme C-ourt or a similar body will face the problem ofwhe*rer statutes
such as the Canadian Copyright Act extinguish prior common laws, ostensibly including aboriginal
customary law.31 Despite these arguments to the contrary, $e principles oudined by the Suprerne
Court of Canada in cases deciding abongrnal rights clarms, and the legal suprernacy of constitutional
law, suggess d:rat a future intelpreation oFthese issues by Canada's highest court has a good chance
of upholding aboriginal customary law.
A constitutional affirmation of aborigural customary law has great value as compared to
lesser statutes and marking systems. For one, Supreme Court judgnents generally apply nationwide,
which h Canad4 would uphold the customary inungible rights systems of many aborignal peoples.
Moreover, a favourable Supreme Court interpretation sends a strong intelpretive guideline to lesser
courts that arc likely to hear the bulk of cases involving infringemens and misuses of aboriginal
cultural heriage.
Intemational Stretcgics
Aithough there are certainly some intemational documents at the moment which oudme the nghts
and expectations of indigenous peoples with regard to dreir cultural integrity and sustainability, there
remains intemational disagreement about the wording of these documents (e.g. the Draft Declaration
remains a draft document due to a lack of consensus). Many nations refuse to ratiS agreernents that
entail some degree of responsibility towards indigenous peoples or a curtailment of national
sovereignty. Moreover, the agreements are essentially non-binding meaning drat d:rere are no dispute
resolution procedures or sanctions that can be placed on sates that violate these agreements. The
WTO-TRIPS agreernent by contrast, has a dispute resolution procedure and is legally equipped to
penalize outsanding violations with trade penaltres and other sanctions. For this reason, strategies
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L utrlizing the Gmgraphicd Indicators (GI) clauses in *re TRIPS agrement are more advantageous
from an enforceabrlity pornt of vrew.
a. Rights Beyond Salc? Thc Question of Auttofs Moral Rights
Mira Raian has argued that despite its strong association between romantrc individualism and westem
anistrc traditions, the doctrine of mora.l rigfrs has been interpreted more broadly in countries such as
india, Russia and Mali to help support the preservation of cultural heritage. She examines how an
Indian court nrled in favour of a famed murzlist plaintiff and against the government's misuse of and
destruction ofhis work usng the doctnne of moral rights under the Indian Copyright Act (ratifred
according to dre Berza Conwntion).In Anar Nati Schgal r Union of India, $e court held *rat an author
had a moral entidement to have his or her work treated with an appropriate amount of care and due
diligence, which &re state of India was found to have violated thrcuglr its appa.rcflt carelessfless
(Raian,2001, p. 81). Although Raian notes that the Indian goyerffnent amended the Copylght Act
shonly after &ris unexpected verdict to limit dre precedent left by the cours' trnfavourable
interpreration, she argues that the decision leaves an imporant legacy in other ways.
For one, it separates dle arbitrzry Anglo-Europran distinction between culnrral and
intellectr.ral property, snce the two are bound together and internvined from the point of view of
traditional societies. In the case of moral rights, *re right in question extends beyond to both tangible
and tangrble spheres. Moral rigfrts in the case of Anar S. u Union of Indiahave cleady entailed a rigfrt
to have one's work respected physically, while other case examples emphasize the authors right not
to be defamed and his or her work unfaidy mrsrepresented. Presumably, any case involving the
balance betvleen this latter interpreation of moral riglrs expectations and dre right to satire, parody
and free speech would be a fine one. Article 6bis of the Beme Convention states,
(1) Independendy of the audrols economic rigbts, and even after the transftr of the said riglts, the
author shall have the dght to claim authonhip of tie wo* and to obiect to ery distonioo, mutilation
or other modiEcation of, or other derogatory action io relation o, &e said wo*, which vould be
prejudicial to his honor or reputalion.r2
It is possible to see how the "distortion. . .or derogatory action" wording under article 6bis of the
Beme convention could be interpreted by aboriginal plaintiffs to refer to the misuse or
misrepresentation of communal cultural heritege by third parties.33 It is diffrcult to see how Paco
Rabanne and Jean Paul Gaultier's culturally rnsensinve usage of Maori motifs would not constitute a
distortion of the authentic relationship of these motifs to their Maori "authon." Neverdreless, the
use of moral ri$rts as cultural policy or traditional customary nghts appears to be very untested legal
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terrain. Raian's erphasis on moral righs to prosecute the destruction or loss of traditiona.l cultural
property seems more a more tenable strategy for tradiuonal societies, at least in the near term.
Even this may be problematic as many objects of cultr:ral patrimony are very ancieng
making the relation between contemporary ndiggnous authors and the authors of the patrimony in
question very remote.sa Similady, the issue of compelling individual 'representatives' ofcollective
cultural traditions to adhere to the westem categories of "artist" or "authof in order to litigate such
cases, poses familiar questions of how individuals can legitimately own and represent collectively
authored v'orks .
Raian sugess that despite problems in the use of moral riglrts litigation to protest cultural
misrepresenrations, distortions and 'derogatory actions,' mainly due to the expense and time involved
in litigation, "[the] TRIPS [Agreement] does, in principle, require member countries to adopt moral
rights sandards which conform to Anicle 6bis of the Beme Convention" (Raian, 90) She indicates
that as the TRIPS sFtem nntures, moral riglrs litigation and precedent may become more "firlly
integrated into dre mtematonal copyright regrme" (Raian, 90).
b. Geogrephical Indicators under TRIPS: Righa for Creetive Tredition?
It is a norrnative goal *rat the customary laws of traditional societies be used in lieu of Anglo
European legal systerns, instead of the current reverse situation. This goal is arguably threatened by
supranational accords such as TRIPS that prompt sates to create statutory laws in harmonization
with US-EU intellecnral property law. For the multinational corporate actors in the United States,
Japan and European Union that successfrrlly lobbied their govemmens to push the TRIPS
agreement through dre GATT-WTO Uruguay round of neggtiations in the frrst place, increaing
protections for pharmaceuticals, software, and electronic enterainment goods rn developing
countries was the major objective (Matthews, 2001. Althoug! developing countries enphasize
technology transfers and mcreased chaices for forergn direct investrnent as being sufficient
incentives for developing countries to amend *reir intellectual property laws ard enforcemerit
mechanisms acconding to the TRIPS template, it is likely *rat many countries will lose more
resources through higher prices for patented products and medicfres &an they stand to benefit in
increased transfen and investrnent Qr{atthews, 2002). Indigenous advocates have been equally critical
ofthe TRIPS agreements failure to explicidy protect indigenous medicinal, plant varieties and
ecological knowledge from appropriation and patenting by pharmaceutical and agribusness
corporations (I4atthews, 2002; Shiva & Bhar, 1996).
However, it may well be $at the TRIPS agreement has some unintended ambivalence in
terms of hovr it can be used by indigenous groups. While many indigenous advocates and scholars in
L
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L t}e field of biopiracy and farmers rigfrts reiect geographical indicators as anything other than a
complernent to sui generis systems, in the area of cultural goods, geogra.phical indicators may provide
I umore usefiJ set of 2.lready existent and intemationzlly applicable intellectul property protections.35L
France and Scodand have developed paniculady organized and deta ed geographical indicators to
I delineate between d:re different regions associated with wodd famous wines, cheeses and scotch
I
whiskeys respectively.h These geographic indicators make it illegal for other regions to idenufu their
I products using the name Scotch or Borrdeaux, thus curtailing the trade in illegitimate andL misrepresentatrve producrs.
One of the main concems facing indigenous cultural producers is the prospect of imitation
L products usulping economic gain from traditional craftspmple, while at the sarne time distorting
, Consumer views ofw*rat constitutes high quality traditional arts and crafis (Evans & Pinel, 1994). To
L remedy this problern, many scholars have proposed the geographic indications (GI) clauses under the
TRIPS agreement as a possible means of marking and identiffing authentic cultural goods from a
t specific geographic locality from fake and imitation products.
I Thus, tribal groups such as the Pueblo could develop a Puebloan regional distinction orL mark, to be applied to all goods exported out ofthe regon (whether to other states and provinces or
nations). This stateg5r rnay evefl e&rble Puebloan storyteller craftspersons to obtain a distinctive
L geographical indicator or trademark for this specific craft, as a means of preventing hter-tribal
cu.ltural appropriatioas (e.g. Navajo "Storytellen'). Other benefis from this stategy include its
l
L paocular appropriateness for communities wishing to collecnvely establish the mles and guidelines
associated with dre traditional and hter-generational methods and techniques (Downs, 1997,p. l4):
L
IL
While these aspecs of geographical indicators seem paruculady well suited to cultural producers who
I maintain a close connection to dre land alrd seek to preserve ceoturies old traditions, the regional
Ig focus of this mtellectr.ral property right has eamed some criticism.
l
L Bill Morrow has sugested dnt the 'obvious flaw' with geogr2.phical indicators has to do
wrth the status of indigenous peoples who travel about the wodd @th voluntarily and involuntarily)
| -d attempt to continue traditional activities in varying gmgra.phica.l locations. Although this doesL
seem problematic for some groups, it doesn't seem to be a problem that uniquely faces
I fographically mobile traditional craftspeople. French winemakers and Scottish brew masters have
It- also traveled the wodd, using traditional wure and spidt production techniques in varying national
IL
t
While the ptoduction methods can evolve over time, there is a strong emphasis on tradition, vith
roots drat arc centuries old @mes, 1997,p.14).
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L locales. In the same manner that comparatively new wine ma}ers and whiskey manufacturers have
had to spend decades building up a positive reputation and distinctiveness, so too do geographically
I -obile craftspeople need to invest time building up new traditions in different geographies, whichL
presumably can be accommodated with drfferent geographical ndicators. Geographical particularities
i tend to blend widr "old" traditions in any case, making any "roving geogra.phical indicators"
I
increasingly unrepresentative (over trme) of the traditional practices they would ostensibly continue
I to claim as cornrnon heriage.
L
c. Mrttartua Dccl,eration and 6e Dteft Declaration on the Righrs of Indigenous Peoples: Do
i they Matter?I
As one of the last instrumens of intemationzlly recognized indigenous htellecnul property policy,
l
t we have dte Maltaataa Dularation and trc DmJt Duhntion on lhe Nghts of Indigmou PeEbs. Vtirhotx
going rnto great detail about the agreemeflts and their bistory and significance, we can make a few
I urief remarks.L
Among dre lessons we can draw frcm $e Dr@ Declaratiott is the significance of the 'schism'
I it exhibits in global thinking towards indigenous peoples. It is not significarrt that the documentt- remains a'draft'due to a lack ofconsensus towards the issue of indigenous peoples within UN
I -ember states. Many states, especially those in Asia, have exhibited an exteme reluctance to evenL recognize indigenous peoples as groups deserving of special attention and preservative energies. No
doubt, one of the re'xons for the failure to recognize indigenous peoples a discrete peoples with their
lL own hterests and imperatives, is the worry that such recognition risks fragmenting a sense of
national unity and cohesiveness @obbins, 1999, p. 10; Bengwtyan,2002). Additronally, does
I|_ recogniuon entail a responsibility to preserve lands and ecological arex from economic development
activities such as mrning and deforestanon?
1^
L C-ompounding the Draf Dularatiom failure to obain ratification from all party nation states,
both intemanonal legrslative documents remain legally unenforceable within dre United Nations or
I afly odrer supranational body (Genugten, 2004). One asks then, what value do these documents haver- 
at all?
I In answer, they nonetheless provide a valuable source of progressive legislation that has
It- already seen and withstood extensive consultation with many indigenous NGOs, groups and tribal
I organizations. For nations with particulady backwards policies towards indigenous peoples, public
L relations pressures and human righs tribunals and organizations can continue to exeft p(essure on
such natiofls to harmonize with these agreernents @ngaayan,2002). As more nations such as the
IL Phillipines use the agreements as a template for very progressive amendments to their human rights
and intellectual property rigfrs laws, these pieces of legislation nonetheless operate as set of ethical
IL
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L guidelines and a de facto 'indigenous point of view' for nations that haven't yet conducted
consultative hearings.
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Pan VIII: Conclusion
Qucstions to Guide Further Research
A number of questions arose during the coune of the research and writing of dris paper, which
althougfr interesting nvolved a prohibitive degree of disantiation from the central variables and
relationships at issue. Althougfr many oF these questions have been discussed to a degree in some of
the literature reviewed and used in the writng of thrs sttrdy, they could certainly benefit from further
research.
a. Is Cultural 'Proectiolr' e Euphemism for Cultural Isolationism?
It has been the relatively unexamined assumption of this entire paper that protecting indrgenous
culhrres from unwanted ouside exposures and borrowings is an ethical and desirable social good in
and of itself. Nonetheless, there have been many aborighzl and non-aboriginal voices in the case
literature that have questioned the supposedly unmitrgated good of cultural protectionism.
Some, such as Bill Morow, have questioned v'hether 'traditional society' and 'culnrrally
distincd necessarily comcide. Morrow argues of overt regionalisrrg isolationist cultura.l policies and
similar sui generis measures, that
There is a. ..danger tbat we may become ovedy pr,ot€ctive towands cultures and fail to recognize than
in some regions tftere are traditions of appropriation. For example, many Circbon desigos have been
crcate d by alpropriating imagery ftom a vide number of culturcs includiag China, Indi4 the Middle
East and Europe and yet in the Pasisir tbere has also been a good ded of btaunt copyiag of other
people's wo* includhg copying of fairy tale illusttations (tr'(ocow, 2000, 20).
The term "traditions of appropriation" is particulady thought provoking. Are the benefits of
appropriation, the sharing of knowledge between cultures and the enrichmeflt of our own cultures,
social goods that iusti$ interventions that are unwatrted and unwelcome by a given community?
What if that community is divided, as the Maon appear to have been regarding cultural
appropriations by ousiden. While Forrner Te Tai Hauauru MP Tuloroirangi Moqgan and fronically)
high fashion consumer himself,3T stlted of Rabanne and Gaultier's borrowrngs that "the French are
just rude and ignorant and they come as no surprise given the history of French and Poll.nesian
people," the enthusiastrc John Tamihere remarked that
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We must reioice in our diversity, and not vallow in our differences. It is riglrt to tolerate lhose vho
want to wear a kilt, or hemp suit, iust as it is rigbt to tolerate md respect those that vant to wear a
moko, No one has a monolnly on our unending story ofnatioohood; no one has the manual for our
nationhood.ls
Tamihere's remark by no means indicate a consensus of opinion, but it does sugpst a complex
dialectical relationship. C-omplete anltur:l closed-ness even if such a state were possible, carries with
it the prospect of isolationism and in its extreme forrrq xenophobia. In a sense, these quotes exhibit
the 'distastfrrl fringes' of the debate. On the one hand, Tamihere seerrs naively utopian, even
irresponsible. Who is he to unilaterally declare that kilt's are open season for anyone's cultural
identification - as diluted a marker of culnrral located-ness though that artifact might be? Ifno one
has a monopoly on cultura.l isolation, surely even fewer have the authority to declare a distinctive
culture open for business, presumably at any cost.
I-asdy, Bill Morrow's sugestion that cultur:l approprialon has benefis, while no doubt
true, avoids the prospect ofa compromise between appropriation without conserit and borrowings
with perrnission. The Toi Iho systerrq with is 'Mainiy Maori' and 'Maori Co Production" suggest
altematives that involve a cerain degee of parmership between a culture's representatives and
interested outsiders.
b. Finding Allics Among the Anti-Pmprictarians
Influential anu-proprietanan (or free culture advocatet legal scholan such as James Boyle, Lawrence
kssrg Yochai Benkler, Roland Bettig and Jessica Littrnan, to name just a few, have either concoctd
persuasive argumens in favour of the productive capacity of the commons (or public domain) or
against the propriearian ethic and is attendant risks to democracy, ftee speech and innovation when
pursued to excess. In contrast to this group ofwell-meaning scholars there are many indigenous
nghs advocates such as Boatema Boateng Michael Brown and othen who have indicated that the
automatic assignation ofmost categones of indigenous culture and knowledge to the public domarn
is a tendency that assiss the appropriation and piracy' of indigenous culture.
Can these two positions be reconciled? It is unclear vhat corrrnon ground can be found
between these two positions, but both parties would appear to benefit from restrictions in the power
of mtellectual property ndustries such as pharrnaceutical, agribusrness, entertainment and software
industries that in some cases oppose restdctions on private property throug! *re enhancernent of the
public domain or the expansion of indgenous sui generis intellectual property rights. This appears to
be a fruid.rl area for further research znd znalysis, wherein commonalities and differences betvreen
the motivations behind the free culture movement, global capiui and indigenous peoples could be
examhed in more detail.
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c. Problcms witt Culural Hybridity and Cepial *C" Culturc
The preceding discussion has invsstigated a broad array of elements havmg to do specifically with
AEIPBs, related agents of intellectual propeny policy and the inconsonant dernands of indigenous
peoples for postcolonial cultural selfdetermination. Undedyrng the logic of AEIPRs and the lopqrcs
of intemational trade regulation bodies and multinational corporzrte actors, is the logic of free trade,
and in cultural terms: hybridity and cultr,rral $obalizauon. Against these tendencies lie the criticism
from indrgenous peoples and their advocates that a mixing of cultr.res drough globalzanon and free
trade tends to be pretudicial towards 'edge cultures'and srruller areas of distinctiveness. As Rosemarv
Coombes argues, 'hybridity is no guarantee ofpostcolonial self{eterrnination; it is as available to the
colonizing practices of capital as it is to dre local strateges of resisance." (Coombe, 215).
The briefly documented sketch of power reladons between the indigenous and outisde wodd
strongly sugests that indigenous dernands for resistance and self-deterrnination stand litde chance
against the overwhelrning political and economic demands of the mainsueam. She notes that drose
who defend the cutturally maagrnaiizing tendencies of intellectual property rigfrts and unrestricted
capital flows under the simplistic bamer of irmovation'lose sight of the impact that dichotomous
power relations have on smaller 'c' cultures. She describes the so-called desires of "capital C
culture"- to be free and unconstrained for the benefit of all as berng higNy idmlogical sances.
Advocates of free and unrestrained accesss by all to the "commonwealth ofhuman culture" stands in
the face of the desires of indigenous peoples to preserve rather than innovate, and localize instead of
globalize. Capial assisted cultural hybridity does not necessarily entail a mosaic ofcultures, but rather
raises the specter of an enormous number of sidelined cultr.res amidst a more homogenous
"monoculture."
d. \[hat of 'Non-Tribal" or 'Urben" Aboriginals? Crugtt bctwccn Tribal end National
Cultural Policy?
Thus far, the examination of indigenous peoples undertaken has conceived ofthem as unified groups
and totalized tribal identities. This conception has been fragmented by the research of Bill Morrow,
Pinel & Evans, Mchael Brown and others, who have exposed inter-tibal and inter-group
divergences in opinion and practice towards culn.ral presewation and appropriation. As Michael
Brown asks,
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What of udan Aboriginals? Wrll claims be made against fte work of aboriginal artiss living in urban
areas, who may not identi$ at all with a particular clan or community? The current traiectory ofpolicy
and legal decisions may leave urtan aboriginals even more marg'inal than they arc at presenr denied
access to political and ecooomic rcsources yet regarded as somehow less authentic than their rural
couoterpars, who stand to bene6t ftom the social chaoges put into play by the Mabo decision.
@rcwn, 2004, p. 66)
D<xs an expansion of tribal power and sovereignty encompass those individuals who are'ethnically'
indigenous but otherwise urban, or 'mainstrearn'? Should cultural Protection and labeling systems
take into accor.rnt the needs and desires of those who live outside the teserve or corxnunity in
question?
Summary
This paper began its mvestrgauon by quesdoning the relationship betweefl .\nglo European
Intellectual Property laws and the norrnatrve hteress of indigenous and tnbal societies. Following
this frtroducton, the first of the two components of this relationship was questioned and analyzed rn
greater deail-
The problematic dehniton of indigenous'was explored and challenged from varyrng points
of view. Ultimately, the analysis restd on two important aspects of many traditional societies, a
tendency towards spiritual and material holism (an absence of the sacred/secular split found in
Anglo-European societies) and societ2l characteristics manifesting from an oral as opposed to literary
communicative mode.
Following this, the second term in the relationship, that of Anglo-European Intellectual
Property Law was investigated with an historical overview the capitalistrc economic and
individualistic tendencies that inforrn is modem status. Attention was given to the current
controyersy between proprietarians (advocates of greater property rights) and free culture/public
domain proponents. This controversy was argued to be especially perunent due to the predominance
of the proprietarian rnclination within agenda setting legislatures in the US and EU, and the close
connection between this issue and political economisS concemed about inequities in the global
production and distribution of protected cultural and biological products (Bettrg 1996; Boateng
2002).
Given realizations that the secondary variable in this analysis, that of intellectual propertv
law'was deemed to arise from a broad array of loca.l, national and intemationa.l instrumens, bodies
and organizations, attention was grven to these different "levels" of intellechral property law
regulation and enforcernent. Institutions and agreements examined included the Baze Conmtion,
ILO, WTO-TRIPS and others.
i
I
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Followhg this, seven case studies were examined in order to compile evidence conceming
vlhether existent intellectual property were conducive to the unique cultural and spirinral needs of
the traditional societies examined. ln most cases, Anglo European societies were found to be higtrly
problematic, with deficiencies arising from the radically different conceptions of "who creates
culture," which kinds of incentives (spirinnt, kinship relationships, econornic) should govem is
creation and how creators should beneht from their effort. Each of the case studies examined
involved an anerrrpt to resolve the discrepancy between indigenous needs and the economic and
cultural assumptions embodied in rntellectual property laws. Following the mitial descnptron ofeach
case, a bdef analysis was underuken with regard to the relative desirability of these solutions.
Nerg the problematrc economic and cultural assumptions in intellectual property law were
examined in greater and more substantial detail. These tendencies were then summarized and
supplemented with supplernental information ftom secondary literature. To refer back to the
intrductory overview, widespread poliry efforts to address these commonly voiced grievances with
AEIPRs vrould likely do much to address the concems of traditional societies. Among the more
needed changes to existing framewodis, the accommodation ofgroup identities and grievances and
the full inclusion of tribal and customary law m arbitratron procedures are especially relevant.
Finally, dre solutions discussed in the case studies and others discussed in secondary
literature were analyzed and reviewed in depth, resulting in a detailed comparison of many varying
altemative strategies and culnrally sensitive indigenous cultural policies. The paper concluded with a
briefdiscussion of some of the many questions and problems that remarn unresolved bv this
investigation, but would make for interesting further research.
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Part VII: Note
1 Assnming oo alieo life forms have laoded on earth and nixed uriftr the general population.
, rmmig'rts is ,lso a misleading descriptor if used erclusivdy. Coqrrrors ad importe of dis€"se @d alcohol is a oore
viable description for agents of a historical episode eorailing much morc thm a desirc of Euro,pcm aewcomers to merely
co€xist with previously existing peoples.
r Briefly, the Calgary School could be described as the "Assimilationist School." Kanieo'kehjka (trfohawk) activist and
scholar Clifton Arihwakehte is a ootable aboriginal respodeot to Flaagan md the Calgary school of thouglr See
of Flmagm's daims md the discursive devices used to frae his 1rcint of view. Arihwakehte argues:
"The inequatity of "ftee speectf' is naketlly exposed in a case like Flanagan's lectu.e at Mccill. By virtue ofhis position
as politicim and academic, Flanagm has easy access to "free sp€€ca"' and despite ttre minor controversy surrounding
his t"lk, his "righd' to speak vas staunchly defen&d by tbe cmpus press. Save tfie few stu&nts ptro etterd€d th€
lectuc in order to protest Flm2gd's racist ,gum€ats, th€Ie {ras no defcose ofAbo;ght peo'plds dght to self-
determination" lndeed it sewes well to ruminate over the prctem obst cles, opsating on institutional and
inteqrersoaal levels, which ensDre that "Edicals" do oot enioy the sme access to "fiee speecli' as politicians like
Fld"gq theftby invoking Orrrdl's dicnrm Sat "all rmeo are eqd but sonr€ rn€n er€ more equal th.m others-" See
above link for mo{e.
a Some eady theorists of plop€rty dghts, such as John lcke, situated property riglrts as a rh*e evolving out of concepts
of the sered, so it is problematic to imply that the Anglo-European society based (theoretically) a! least otr many of l-ockes
(and otiers) theorctical writings, is eatirely distaced ftm srcred cdsideretioos. Nevertkless, the pedod followtog
l,ocke's dissertations included a 'tum towar& 6e individual' md tis right to ovn' tiet hes litde perallel in 6e sacred
uoderstmdirgs of mmy indigenous peoples. While the sacred miglt bave been invoked (by a few individuals, hundreds of
yean ago) to iusti! individual ovnenhip of prcperty (ldQ io genesl, the society that evolved vith those formdatioaal
concepts has long since neglected the holistic spiritual cooaectim fornd ooog most iadigeaous culores.
5 Based on tle Igbo people of Nigeri4 a colmtry of which Achebe is aative-
6 Unsu4risingly, this group ircludes orthodo: ma*et ecotrc'mists such as Milton Fnedna vho ioin this "radical '
bmdwagon out of distnrst of mooopolies md thre-ats to innoyatioa Steve Forbes (of the premarket Forbes magazine) is
also said to bave leot his support to this cxuse.
7 Intemational govemmce critics md political sci€otists poiot to a contiauity of tlese policies followiog the adveot of the
United Natic,ns, suggesting the cootioued ability of nation states to subvert tle iotertions of the UN almost as effectively as
had been the case with the UN pre&cessor orgaoizatioa tle Irague of Natioos (Girard et al p. 72-74).
3 See court trdscript dd ChiefJustice Grezves n iag { htp://vww.yvsiiusdiqvnohii-rct/govl2v/ro6ebulhh
, See hap://www.yvwiiusdinvnohiinet/govlaw/rcsebud-htm
10 Images of Kente cloth types and descriptions ftom hnp://Mtr'w.gbencom/republic/keote/kente.htrnl
11 Images of Batik cloth qpes aad descdptions ftom hnp://vww.exparor.id/hfo/batik-html
12 See quotation from btp://vww.nzedge.cm/feenrres/:r-moko-html (Ile :rticle is also m iarriguiog md iasigldrl
analysis oa tie politics of outsiders use of Maori cultur€).
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13 Some Maod tanoo images collected ftom htp://wv.nzedge.com/features/ar-moko.html
ta Images of Moontide Svimwear from Shand AJO2, p. '12
rs Images ofPueblo Storyteler ftom http://peofieldgallery.com/storytellen/LTsosie.shtol
r6 Images of Navaio Storytdler frm hnp://vyv.penfeldgallery.cm/sto+dlers/PNez.shtml
17 The specter of the tribal govemmeat as a source ofcreative repression md represeatatioal projectioa is a curious
parallel ofbroader subiect-object power relations between iodigenous peoples subiect to laws intended for the white
Eaiodty (e.9. these dyamics are especially formd io Canada Australia md the US, md with mainstream Mexicans and
those who claim specifc tribal idcntities, e.g Se Z-+zristt).
te Thoug! adminedly for differcot reasons. Mozart cooceios would qualif for copyriglt protectioo if such doctrioes
existed ia tie 18d' century, but would have entered the public domain thrcugh the expiration of the limited copFight terrn,
while indigeoous folkloric traditions vould be deemed un-copy.right-able due to the fact tiat the medium ofpractice and
trdsmissiotr is or.l, md thus impem-ment (subi.:ct to probl€ds such rs multiple authorship, widesprcad knowtredge etc, ell
of which probleoatize claims of irdividual ownenhip). Thercfore we again have conditions where culture tiat is
predominmdy oral would be subiect to discrimioatory treatmeat besed on the literate, Batedal (permmency) requirements
of the imposing legal-cultural system.
1e Such geo-res also providing audieaces lrith signficat forckrcwledge of 'thet to e4lecd' of2 p2rticular repr€s€ot tid of
that genre.
F Accotdiog to wikipediq
'"The first sale doctrine is ,o exception to copl'right codified in the US Copyright Act, sectioa 109. The doctrine
of 6rst sale allows the purches€r to trdsfer Ge. sell or give avey) u particular, legdly rquired copy of protected
wod without pemission once it has beco obtaioed That meos tie distribution rigbts of a copyright holder eod
on that paticular copy oace the copy is sold." See http://erwlLipediaorg/wikilFirst-sale_doctrine
See the malogous "Exhaustioo of rights" in applicable Eurcpem Union Copydght Statutes. S€ctioo 109 of the US
Copyriglt Act reads as follows:
"$ 109. Limitations on exclusive rights: Effect of trmsfer ofpaiticular copy or phonorecord,l0 (a)
Notvithstmding the provisions of section 106(3), the owoer of a panicular copy or phonorecord lawfully made
under this tide, or any prsoo authorized by such owner, is entided, without the authority of the copyright oo'ner,
to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phoorecord Notwithstmdiog the preceding
sent€oce, copies or phonorccor& ofwo*s subject to iestoied cop,'right lmder section 104A tbet are
mmuf*tured before the &te of restoration of copyrigbt or, vith rcsp€ct to reliance parties, before publication or
service ofnotice rmder sectioa 1O4A(e), may be sold or otherwise disposed ofwithout the authorizatioo of the
oq,.der of the nestoGd copytight for purpoces of direct or iadirect cmoetcial dvmtege only rhrriog the 12-
month period beginniag oo.. ." See htg://wrv.copyriglegov/tide17 /t b'ry1-L,tml#109
, See http://eawitipediaodwiki/Sui-geoeris
22 See Eadnote 18.
,r See m hsighdr! discussioo of the argum€ats in favour of md against sd getreis protectim for dat2bascs by tvo l2ctyers
from Morrison & Foerster IIP @ashiagtoo DC): hnp://www.dlib.orgldlib/ june97/06bmdhtml
2a Though mendments to coostitutional law are not as easily subiect to legislative whim, constinrtional intelpretetioo
throug! Supt€me courts m.y b€ subiect to the E,poiltments of Padiament (rppointments which may vary in their political
md thus intetpretative lemiags).
,5 Uoerylored here, rmfortrmately due to breadde costraints. However, thrs would b€ a us€fu1 site of elploratic,n md
analysis for further researcb-
I
L
81 of 82
LL
L
I
L
t
L
L
L
L
L
L
I
L
L
t
t
L
IL
L
t ,6 S€e htP: / /wsw.toiiho.com/rboutus/
, See hnp://wc'w.lexum-ugroatrealca/csc-scc/enlpub/ 1997/vol3/html/ 1997scr3-1010.hunl
,3 Se€ http:/ /rww.solorodC.onstitutions/Cmada/English/ca_1982.htm1
2e See Huoter v. Souttrm Inc., [1984] 2 SC.R- 145, note 43, rpplied in vq',n,te 44 2t pzrc. 2]24 (Quoted in Robbins,
1999, p. 18).
{ See R v. Suthedmd, [19801 2 S.C.R a51, refeEed to in rP'z, note ,+4 at p.ra. 25. (Quoted in Robbins, 1999, p. 18)
:t See Robbins, 1999, p. 24-25.
3, S€e hftp://wwe.wipojot/treatia/en/b/bcme/mdocs-wo0o1-html#P 123_m726
3r S€e Eodnote 29.
3a This issue is no doubt involved io ttre (fuly, 2005) US Ninth Court of App€ats ruting against the desift of indigerous
peophs to secuE exclusive eccess to the body of Kennewick mm, aa unearthed homo sapim vho died over 9p00 years
ago. A BBC ooliae repon &afu fu case zs follovs: -Figlt atirc?ologistr sued to study 6€ bo6 after tb€ US
govemo€ot seized ti€m o behalf of Native Americm tribal goups, vho claim lGonewick Mm as m mcestor ard wmt
to rebury his sLeletoa Since eady 2004, vhen the US Ninth Circuit Crun ofAppeals mled in the mthrcpologists' favour,
scieotists have beeo aegotiating witb govemmeot agencies on a study protocol said Paula Barrm" a lawyer fot the plaiotiff
sciertists." See hq://nevs.bbc.co-uk/Uhilsci/tech/,1651831.stm
35 See Vmdma Shiva's online article '"The Basmati Batde md Its Implications For Biopiracy & TRIPs'
hap: / /www.navdmya.odarticles/basmati-batde.htm
ft For exmple, Bor&ur, Chmpagne, Rh6ne, I-oire Valley, are distinctive md exclusive geographical indicators for
French wine, ad Speysi&, Hig$anls, Isley md Lowlm& serve siai.rr fimctins for wodd fmus Sconish SiDgh Malt
whiskey.
37 See hnp://vvs'.nzedge.com/featur€s/.r-moko.html
38 S€e http://vs,v.scoop.co.trzlsto.ies/PA0002/SO0128.htm
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